# Benjamin H Bratton: An Update on The Stack

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So thank you, Armin, for the introduction. Thanks everyone for turning out this evening. And also thank you to the organizers of Datatopia. It's been an amazing workshop this morning, and this whole event is really quite incredible. So it's really my pleasure and honor to be here.

謝謝 Armin 的介紹。感謝大家今晚出席。還要感謝 Datatopia 的組織者。今天早上這是一個很棒的研討會，整個活動真的非常不可思議。所以我很高興和榮幸來到這裡。

I'll say just to respond to Armin's point here as well, I think maybe the question is more to do with less that theory has gone away or been replaced by software. This is a good thing. But rather, I think perhaps the relationship between theory and design has hopefully switched in a different way, where there may have been a moment in which theorists would develop a set of terms or concepts, and then designers would make designs that resemble those things. So you get architecture that looks like Derrida, or architecture that looks like Deleuze, or Triple O, God forbid. And I think now it's sort of perhaps inverted that the technology in many ways is ahead of our concepts.

我也想在這裡回應 Armin 的觀點，我認為這個問題可能更多地與理論已經消失或被軟件取代有關。這是一件好事。相反，我認為也許理論與設計之間的關係有望以一種不同的方式轉變，在這種情況下，理論家可能會發展出一套術語或概念，然後設計師會做出類似於這些東西的設計。所以你會得到看起來像德里達的建築，或者看起來像德勒茲或 Triple O 的建築，上帝保佑。我認為現在技術在很多方面都領先於我們的概念，這可能有點顛倒了。

And the job of philosophy or theory at this point is to try to catch up in a certain degree. OK, so with that in mind, my talk tonight tries to, as Armin suggested, suggest a bit of an update on some of the issues we were working with and around within the book, the stack, and to some extent forms the basis of what will eventually be the next book or books. When Olga and Nikolai and I were planning the New Normal program at Shok Institute in Moscow in the summer of 2016, we were deep in the thick of the US presidential election cycle. As you will recall, way back then, seems like a long time ago, various populist storms were swirling in many directions at once, some progressive, some reactionary, and many that didn't fit neatly along a left-right linear spectrum. And in that post-Brexit and pre-Trump moment, I wrote, in the exact spot where a viable future should be, something insufferably backwards fills it in, a psychotic simulation of medieval geopolitics burning as bright as creepy clown hair.

而哲學或理論在這一點上的工作就是在一定程度上努力趕上。好的，考慮到這一點，正如 Armin 所建議的那樣，我今晚的演講試圖對我們正在處理的一些問題以及本書中圍繞的一些問題提出一些更新，堆棧，並在某種程度上構成了下一本書或幾本書最終會是什麼。 2016 年夏天，當奧爾加、尼古拉和我在莫斯科 Shok Institute 計劃新常態項目時，我們正處於美國總統大選週期的最高峰。你會記得，那時候，似乎是很久以前，各種民粹主義風暴同時向多個方向旋轉，有些是進步的，有些是反動的，還有許多並不完全符合左右線性光譜。在脫歐後和特朗普前的那一刻，我寫道，在一個可行的未來應該存在的確切位置，一些令人難以忍受的倒退填充了它，對中世紀地緣政治的精神病模擬像令人毛骨悚然的小丑頭髮一樣燃燒。

And so, indeed, the whole age of computer has made it where nobody knows exactly what's going on. The rise of ethno-nationalist and or neo-traditionalist populism is, of course, a global phenomenon with global causes, yet in each case, the locals either blame or congratulate themselves for their unique accomplishment or failure. But from Manila to Milwaukee, we see the same demographic voting patterns of urban, highly educated cosmopolitans versus rural, less educated monocultural nationalists and or national monoculturalists. So even as globalization has delinked sovereignty from geography in uneven ways, we try to deal with this phenomenon one 18th century jurisdiction at a time. And yet this is also when networks of city-states seem decisively detached from their national hosts.

因此，事實上，整個計算機時代已經讓人們無法確切地知道發生了什麼。民族民族主義和/或新傳統主義民粹主義的興起當然是一種具有全球原因的全球現象，但在每一種情況下，當地人都會為自己獨特的成就或失敗而自責或慶幸。但從馬尼拉到密爾沃基，我們看到城市、受過高等教育的世界主義者與農村、受教育程度較低的單一文化民族主義者和/或國家單一文化主義者的人口投票模式相同。因此，即使全球化以不平衡的方式使主權與地理脫鉤，我們仍試圖一次處理一個 18 世紀的司法管轄區這一現象。然而，這也是城邦網絡似乎果斷地與其國家宿主分離的時候。

So for those from the districts 13 of our real-life Hunger Games, the city may be seen as a source of arbitrary power, and in this way, urbanization itself is a focus of populist backlash. Perhaps the harm of this is that under the guise of popular inclusiveness, populism actually reduces and narrows the range of all political articulation to only the remedial vocabularies with which it's capable of speaking. Now mid-Trump and pre-who-knows-what, we wonder about what, in fact, is to be designed by whom and how, and how we should address this circumstance directly for what it is. And as idiocratic global politics puts so many things in question, including the future and design futures, it does not, however, change the reality of the system-scale problems that we face. So while there's many reasons to hold in suspicion those whose main entitlement is to stand earnestly against the real, we may do the same for those whose primary alibi is simple futurism.

因此，對於來自我們現實生活中的飢餓遊戲 13 區的人來說，城市可能被視為專制權力的源泉，這樣一來，城市化本身就是民粹主義反彈的焦點。也許這樣做的危害在於，在大眾包容性的幌子下，民粹主義實際上將所有政治表達的範圍縮小並縮小到它能夠說話的補救性詞彙。現在特朗普中期和前誰知道什麼，我們想知道什麼，實際上是由誰設計的，如何設計的，以及我們應該如何直接解決這種情況。由於專制的全球政治對很多事情提出質疑，包括未來和未來設計，然而，它並沒有改變我們面臨的系統規模問題的現實。因此，雖然有很多理由懷疑那些主要權利是認真反對真實的人，但我們也可以對那些主要不在場證明是簡單的未來主義的人做同樣的事情。

Among the main reasons for this is that the conventional definition of the future is oftentimes in design thinking means 10 to 50 years from now. The year 2050, for example, is not the future. For any serious systems design, we're already designing 2050 today, and doing so rather poorly for the most part. But additionally, the alternative alibi of presentism, that addressing the real world requires only the most myopic forms of stakeholder utilitarianism without further abstraction, is perhaps precisely what makes the deferral into weak futures or pasts possible in the first place. That said, it's certain that having the time to think long-term is increasingly a privilege.

其中一個主要原因是未來的傳統定義在設計思維中通常是指從現在起 10 到 50 年。例如，2050 年不是未來。對於任何嚴肅的系統設計，我們今天已經在設計 2050，而且在大多數情況下做得相當糟糕。但除此之外，現在主義的另一種不在場證明，即解決現實世界只需要最短視的利益相關者功利主義形式，而無需進一步抽象，也許正是首先使推遲到脆弱的未來或過去成為可能的原因。也就是說，可以肯定的是，有時間從長遠考慮越來越成為一種特權。

And so it's not that I criticize the need of addressing immediate problems, but doing so doesn't always add up to what it wants to add up to. Presentism and shallow futurism conspire to validate an intuitive sense of cause and effect bound within an autobiographical tempo of life and death and wish fulfillment. They're inadequate as design models, and design is only one of the jobs we have, the names we have for the job at hand. So in contrast with the smug of human-centered design, we should presume that subjective user experiences of cause and effect are necessarily flawed and insufficient as direct models of good design directly, and so to look elsewhere. So as opposed to this, then, the Copernican turn in design that I would champion focuses on intelligence as an emergent effect of matter and of material technologies, the grammar, the grave, the GPU, and so on.

因此，我並不是批評解決眼前問題的必要性，但這樣做並不總能達到它想要達到的效果。當下主義和膚淺的未來主義合力驗證了在生死和願望實現的自傳節奏中綁定的因果直覺。它們作為設計模型是不夠的，設計只是我們的工作之一，我們手頭工作的名稱。因此，與自鳴得意的以人為本的設計相比，我們應該假設因果關係的主觀用戶體驗必然是有缺陷的，並且不足以直接作為良好設計的直接模型，因此要轉向別處。因此，與此相反，我支持的哥白尼設計轉向將智能作為物質和材料技術、語法、墳墓、GPU 等的新興效應。

So hoping to argue against prevailing winds a bit and to play with this talk a bit of a Satan's lawyer on the—let me explain this. I was doing an interview with a journalist from China a few—now, maybe six months ago, and he kept—was asking me these questions, and he would sort of interrupt me at different points, like, I'm sorry, I don't mean to be Satan's lawyer about this or this. And I finally had to ask him, like, what do you mean—what are you talking about? And I finally realized he meant devil's advocate for this. And since then, I—this is my thing, so I'm going to be Satan's lawyer a little bit in this—in my talk.

因此，希望能與盛行的風向爭論一點，並在這個話題上玩弄一下撒旦的律師——讓我解釋一下。幾年前我正在接受一位來自中國的記者的採訪——現在，也許是六個月前，他一直在問我這些問題，他會在不同的時候打斷我，比如，對不起，我不我的意思是成為撒旦的律師。最後我不得不問他，就像，你是什麼意思——你在說什麼？我終於意識到他指的是魔鬼的代言人。從那以後，我——這是我的事，所以我要在這方面——在我的談話中充當撒旦的律師。

Against the present moment, maybe, the job remains still toward our successive generations to build on and against previous accomplishments and to automate and democratize processes for escaping our intuitive and arbitrary biases, not reinforcing their chauvinisms. The world itself is a model open to design and designation, not by false mastery, but because our planet uses humans and other things to know itself and to remake itself. We are, in short, the medium, not the message. So as Armen mentioned, I'll introduce a few sort of ideas in this talk that make you think of an update of this book, The Stack. For those of you—it's a book that's one picture, as I was saying this morning, one picture in 500 pages of caption to this one diagram.

或許，就目前而言，我們後代的工作仍然是在以前的成就的基礎上再接再厲，並使流程自動化和民主化，以擺脫我們直覺和武斷的偏見，而不是強化他們的沙文主義。世界本身是一個可以設計和指定的模型，不是通過錯誤的掌握，而是因為我們的星球利用人類和其他事物來認識自己和改造自己。簡而言之，我們是媒介，而不是信息。正如 Armen 提到的，我將在本次演講中介紹一些想法，讓您想到本書 The Stack 的更新版。對於你們這些人來說——這是一本書，一張圖片，就像我今天早上說的，500 頁中的一張圖片，上面有一張圖的標題。

For those—just very quickly, the book makes two key arguments. One is that what we call planetary scale computation has both distorted and deformed traditional Westphalian logics of political geography, and in doing so has also created new territories in its own image. And two, that these various genres of planetary scale computation—smart grids, cloud platforms, mobile apps, cities, Internet of Things, IoT, and so forth—can be seen not as a bunch of different species of computation all spinning out on their own, but actually as forming a kind of coherent whole. These technologies align layer by layer into something like a vast, if also incomplete, pervasive, if also irregular, accidental megastructure called the stack that is both a computational apparatus and a new governing architecture. So in short, these layers—so to go where at the earth layer we have ecological flows that become sites of intensive sensing and quantification and governance, cloud computing that spurs various platform economies, creating virtual geographies in its own image.

對於那些——很快，這本書提出了兩個關鍵論點。一是我們所謂的行星尺度計算扭曲和變形了政治地理學的傳統威斯特伐利亞邏輯，並且在這樣做的過程中也按照自己的形象創造了新的領土。第二，這些不同類型的行星規模計算——智能電網、雲平台、移動應用程序、城市、物聯網、物聯網等等——不能被看作是一堆不同類型的計算，它們都在各自的基礎上發展自己，但實際上形成了一種連貫的整體。這些技術逐層排列成一個巨大的、不完整的、無處不在的、不規則的、偶然的巨型結構，稱為堆棧，它既是計算設備又是新的管理架構。簡而言之，這些層——所以在地球層我們有生態流的地方，這些生態流成為密集傳感、量化和治理的場所，雲計算刺激各種平台經濟，按照自己的形象創造虛擬地理。

In this we see how cloud platforms sometimes absorb traditional core functions of the state and vice versa, that states evolve into cloud platforms. Cities forming vast, discontiguous networks as they weave their borders into enclaves and exclaves and escape routes. Virtual addressing systems locating billions of entities into events and events into unfamiliar maps. Interfaces presenting vibrant augmentations of reality and standing in for extended cognition. Users both human and non-human populating this tangled apparatus, this accidental megastructure we call the stack.

在此我們看到雲平台有時如何吸收國家的傳統核心職能，反之亦然，即國家演變成雲平台。城市形成了巨大的、不連續的網絡，因為它們將邊界編織成飛地、飛地和逃生路線。虛擬尋址系統將數十億實體定位到事件中，並將事件定位到不熟悉的地圖中。界面呈現充滿活力的現實增強並代表擴展認知。人類和非人類用戶都在這個錯綜複雜的裝置中工作，這個意外的巨型結構我們稱之為堆棧。

The point then is that the stack thesis may model the dynamics of sovereignty at each layer somewhat separately but modularly and recognize how the conclusions of one may determine the terms of conflicts of the others. There is no one layer where the interplay of software and sovereignty is more truly and properly located and then radiating from there. Sovereignty is in fact contested and produced at each of these layers, not just in ways that are recognizably, quote, political. This multiplies then the mapping complexity because the fundamental problems of governance, that is replication, recursion, and enforcement, are more widespread. At the same time, and this is the point that I'll draw out a little bit more in this talk, the production of new territories occurs as much, if not now more so, by states, how states absorb the functions of the cloud and indeed themselves become cloud platforms.

關鍵在於，堆棧論題可以對每一層的主權動態進行某種程度上獨立但模塊化的建模，並認識到一個人的結論如何決定其他人的衝突條款。沒有任何一層軟件和主權的相互作用能更真實、更恰當地定位，然後從那裡輻射出去。事實上，主權在這些層級中的每一層都受到爭議和產生，而不僅僅是以可識別的、引述的政治方式。這會成倍增加映射的複雜性，因為治理的基本問題，即復制、遞歸和執行，更為普遍。同時，這就是我將在本次演講中進一步闡述的重點，新領土的產生與各州一樣多，如果不是現在更多的話，各州如何吸收雲的功能事實上，它們自己也變成了雲平台。

So instead of thinking of new states, new spaces, as something developing in opposition to the state, as understood as sort of fixed models or landlocked entities against which liquid flows would swim, as so many who sort of valorize networks over citadels or bazaars over cathedrals would have it, we see instead that the states are producing new territories and perhaps in ways that are more important, the state as the state is actively respatialized as a stack system. This spatial novelty, if not also the geographical innovation, again, is as much on the state side of the equation. Now the relative continuity of these spaces that may span from a hard enclosure within a bounded territorial domain to trans-oceanic and atmospheric encapsulations through informational securitization and monetization, that is, hemispherical stacks, not national stacks. And by this we see something a bit more like Schmitt's Grossraum, great spaces, not Sloterdijkian spherization or a neo-cameralist patchwork, which really is more a multiplication of Westphalian zones, though we do also see how private polities proliferate. Which is to say that we see the emergence then of not one global stack but a mitosis of the stack genera into a regime of multipolar hemispherical stacks in which the sovereign steerage of states, even if unbounded by Westphalian borders, is paramount.

因此，與其將新狀態、新空間視為與國家相反發展的事物，不如將其理解為液體流動所針對的固定模型或內陸實體，就像許多人將網絡穩定在城堡或集市上一樣大教堂會擁有它，我們反而看到各州正在生產新的領土，也許以更重要的方式，作為州的州被積極地重新空間化為堆棧系統。這種空間新穎性，如果不是地理創新，同樣也是在等式的國家方面。現在，這些空間的相對連續性可能從有界領土內的硬封閉到通過信息安全化和貨幣化的跨洋和大氣封裝，即半球堆棧，而不是國家堆棧。由此我們看到了一些更像施密特的 Grossraum 的東西，偉大的空間，而不是 Sloterdijkian 球形化或新相機主義的拼湊，這實際上更像是威斯特伐利亞區域的倍增，儘管我們也確實看到私人政體如何激增。也就是說，我們看到的不是一個全球堆棧的出現，而是堆棧屬的有絲分裂進入多極半球堆棧的製度，在這個制度中，即使不受威斯特伐利亞邊界的限制，各國的主權管理也是至高無上的。

Such hemispherical stacks place information frameworks in relation to forms of sovereignty that they engender. Their geographic scope and their procedural integration of data as their key sovereign substance are the basis of their capacity for territorial innovation and governance. Here we see the collision of data transmission technologies, multiscalar and multiplatform forms of legal sovereignty, geopolitical human rights regimes, economic structure, and so forth, all built into competing adjacent megastructures of interrelated but noisy dynamics and their layered different forms of feedback. Now how sovereignty is created, generated, or cored out differently by each layer, earth, cloud, city, address, interface, users within different stacks, plays out quite differently. And so the designability of such systems that mediate sovereignty is thus posed once again for us.

這種半球形堆棧將信息框架與其產生的主權形式相關聯。他們的地理範圍和將數據作為關鍵主權實體的程序整合是他們領土創新和治理能力的基礎。在這裡，我們看到了數據傳輸技術、多尺度和多平台形式的法律主權、地緣政治人權制度、經濟結構等的碰撞，所有這些都內置於具有相互關聯但嘈雜動態的相互競爭的相鄰巨型結構及其分層不同形式的反饋中。現在，每一層、地球、雲、城市、地址、界面、不同堆棧中的用戶如何以不同方式創建、生成或核心出主權，其結果完全不同。因此，調解主權的此類系統的可設計性再次為我們提出。

In the secondary, a lot of the secondary literature around the book of the stack and many of the design projects that emerged inspired by it one way or another, in ways that make perfect sense, we would see that there is a strong focus on the cloud layer and how cloud platforms take on many of the functions of the Westphalian state. And this has brought with it a kind of sub-genre of speculative design works as a way of drawing alternative territories and sovereign media, passports, currencies, brands, voting, citizenship, properties and so forth, all of which might, I think, too easily confuse the semiotic accoutrements of sovereign systems with those systems themselves. The invitation to reopen technologies of governance as questions for design is, of course, well taken. At the same time, the equally important, to underscore this again, inverse, how states turn into cloud platforms is met with less sanguine narratives, usually focusing on surveillance and securitization and how to cultivate complex systems protected from the debilitating noise and abuse of bad actors, but also in some cases, and certainly not all, of personal withdrawal from what is understood as illegitimate forms of publicity and publicness altogether. And so the paradoxes, which are not simple, of radical openness and radical privacy are only intensified.

在次要方面，許多關於堆棧書的次要文獻以及許多受其啟發而出現的設計項目，以一種非常有意義的方式，我們會看到強烈關注雲層以及雲平台如何承擔威斯特伐利亞州的許多功能。這帶來了一種投機設計作品的子流派，作為一種繪製替代領土和主權媒體、護照、貨幣、品牌、投票、公民身份、財產等的方式，我認為，所有這些都可能，很容易將主權系統的符號學裝備與這些系統本身混淆。將治理技術作為設計問題重新開放的邀請當然得到了很好的接受。與此同時，同樣重要的是，再次強調這一點，反之，國家如何轉變為雲平台的敘述不那麼樂觀，通常側重於監視和證券化，以及如何培養複雜的系統，使其免受破壞性噪音和不良行為的濫用行為者，而且在某些情況下，當然不是全部，個人退出被理解為非法形式的宣傳和公開。因此，激進的開放和激進的隱私之間的矛盾，這並不簡單，只會加劇。

Everyday acts that are both equally technical and theological, procedural and ritual, such as putting tape over our webcams like Ash Wednesday, a bit like the mark over the pineal eye. They're at the same time sensible and ceremonial, both effective tactical counter-design at the network edge and warding spell. Now, there's a lot to say then about the other layers, and I'll go sort of quickly through this as well. The earth layer, of course, is not just about energy, but how energy infrastructures determine social relations. And unfortunately, a lot of interest in energy sourcing, mineral flows, forms of matter, and how they relate to human biology now struggle under various ponderous mystifications of and expressive obfuscations.

日常行為既是技術性的，也是神學性的，是程序性的，也是儀式性的，比如在我們的網絡攝像頭上貼上膠帶，比如 Ash Wednesday，有點像松果體眼睛上的標記。他們既明智又講究禮節，在網絡邊緣和守衛法術上都是有效的戰術反設計。現在，關於其他層還有很多要說的，我也將快速介紹一下。當然，地球層不僅僅與能源有關，還與能源基礎設施如何決定社會關係有關。不幸的是，許多對能源來源、礦物流動、物質形式以及它們與人類生物學的關係的興趣現在都在各種沉重的神秘化和表達上的混淆中掙扎。

Still, the primary problems of sovereignty at the earth layer largely have to do with the fact that the necessary structures of actors, city-states, and plural agencies that would be necessary for massive carbon remediation and capture, carbon taxation, widespread fourth-generation nuclear, carbon pricing, massive rewilding corridors, and so forth, don't exist. We have the technologies. We don't have the institutions to deploy them. The city layer is where diverse practices are played out in multiple and overlapping assemblages of everyday life. It's where metropolitan singularities and networks of quasi-sovereign city-states hold recursive relationships to their own national host territories at arm's length.

儘管如此，地球層主權的主要問題在很大程度上與這樣一個事實有關，即大規模碳修復和捕獲、碳稅、廣泛的第四代核能、碳定價、大規模的野化走廊等等，都不存在。我們有技術。我們沒有部署它們的機構。城市層是在日常生活的多重重疊組合中進行各種實踐的地方。在這裡，大都市奇點和準主權城邦網絡與他們自己的國家東道主領土保持著遞歸關係，保持一定距離。

The city may be the capital of a territory, or the territory may be its extended jurisdiction, or it may be simply the back office to the metropolitan core. The countryside, as Rem calls it, is where, in many ways, the cloud actually lives. In data centers, logistics archipelagos, and other megastructures largely unoccupied by hominids, and so forms an urbanism of a different sort. At the address layer, multiple ontologies of nomination and classification and mutual accountability compete. It's where things that can be known or unknown are able to communicate and be signaled in relationship to each other.

城市可能是一個地區的首都，或者該地區可能是其延伸的管轄區，或者它可能只是大都市核心的後台辦公室。正如雷姆所說，鄉村在很多方面都是雲實際居住的地方。在數據中心、物流群島和其他巨型建築中，原始人基本上無人居住，因此形成了一種不同類型的城市化。在地址層，提名和分類以及相互責任的多個本體相互競爭。在這裡，已知或未知的事物能夠相互交流並發出信號。

And increasingly, we see a splitting and bifurcation of different addressing systems, a forking of network ontologies. The interface layer is still where the user makes sense of the rest of this. It's how parts of one system seize the other. It's where governance and biosemiotics collaborate. At the interface layer, multiple diagrams close perceptual loops into more closed cognitive frames.

我們越來越多地看到不同尋址系統的分裂和分叉，網絡本體的分叉。界面層仍然是用戶了解其餘部分的地方。這就是一個系統的各個部分如何控制另一個系統的方式。這是治理和生物符號學合作的地方。在界面層，多個圖表將感知循環封閉為更封閉的認知框架。

The form of these interfacial regimes becomes more standardized, while the content is untethered from the real on behalf of motivations of self-reinforcing micro mythologies. It is where, often dangerously, symbolic relations are freely substituted for causal ones. Also, interfaces are not only something users look through at the world, it is also the layer through which the world looks at itself. It's where the sensing assemblages that feed the input layers of landscape-scale AI configure strangely alien and yet familiar sensible worlds at the intra-species signaling dynamics that ensue. The fragility of agency and the boundaries of agents are drawn at the user layer, including but not limited to the status of humans and humanism, individuation and collectivization, encapsulation and prostheticization.

這些界面製度的形式變得更加標準化，而內容則代表自我強化的微觀神話的動機而不受現實的束縛。在這裡，象徵性關係被自由地替換為因果關係，通常是危險的。此外，界面不僅是用戶看世界的東西，也是世界看自己的層次。在這裡，為景觀規模 AI 的輸入層提供數據的傳感組合在隨之而來的物種內信號動態中配置了奇怪而又熟悉的感知世界。代理的脆弱性和代理的邊界在用戶層劃定，包括但不限於人的地位和人道主義、個體化和集體化、封裝和假肢化。

The polyphony of imaginaries for AI and evolutionary robotics, for example, may be trained here. And we may see an unfortunate standardization of corporeal cultures as projected onto a common virtualization, or we may see the negentropic proliferation of co-agencies unaccountable by industrial-era political-economic theory. And here, the contestations as well of sovereign identification and identity are fought, sometimes one idea at a time. For some, identity theft is when someone has a depersonalization episode and then repersonalizes as you instead. For others, the trace of address is not so easily dislodged.

例如，可以在這裡訓練人工智能和進化機器人學的複調。我們可能會看到不幸的物質文化標準化被投射到共同的虛擬化上，或者我們可能會看到工業時代的政治經濟理論無法解釋的共同代理的負熵擴散。在這裡，爭論以及主權認同和身份的爭論都在進行，有時一次是一個想法。對於某些人來說，身份盜竊是指某人經歷過人格解體事件，然後重新人格化為您。對於其他人來說，地址的踪跡並不那麼容易消失。

For some, this may be experienced as a delinking of identity from agency, representation from non-representation. The former played out in forums of public mimesis, and the latter increasingly non-representational, operational, counted but unnamed. Let me then turn to, after this review, let me then turn to this question of the multipolar hemispherical stacks, and this segmenting and this mitosis of the stack phenomenon. What we see largely is, in the last few years, is of course a kind of shift into an increasingly multipolar geopolitical arrangement, the blocks of which are geographically isomorphic with the boundaries of specific stack systems. Each stack's sovereignty then is primarily over the—it's fundamentally over the domain of data that it is available to it to sense and to model and to produce models and simulations of the world through which it in fact governs.

對於一些人來說，這可能會被視為身份與代理、代表與非代表的脫鉤。前者在公共模仿的論壇上發揮作用，而後者則越來越不具代表性、可操作、可計數但未命名。然後讓我轉向，在這次回顧之後，讓我轉向這個多極半球堆疊的問題，以及堆疊現象的這種分割和有絲分裂。我們在很大程度上看到的是，在過去幾年中，當然是一種向日益多極化的地緣政治安排的轉變，其區塊在地理上與特定堆棧系統的邊界是同構的。然後，每個堆棧的主權主要是——它從根本上是在數據領域，它可以用來感知和建模，並生成它實際上統治的世界的模型和模擬。

And I'll go into this as well, each forming a little in this way. Now, the three of the most clearly drawn of the multipolar hemispherical stacks are the—recognizable as the—is those of China, recognizable as BAT, the BAT stack firewall by Giovaldi, Baba Tencent, a kind of Euro-America plus Central—North America plus Central America, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, recognized by the GAFA stack, the Russian stack from the CIS countries also, this is one we'll talk a little bit about as well. And of course there's others in Latin America, Africa, Middle East, Japan in particular. And clearly nationalism and linguistic homology plays a role here, but it doesn't actually explain, I think, quite as much as it might appear. We also see the—in a recent year, the proliferation of a sort of AI as an explicit form of geopolitical gambit with each of these multipolar stacks offering their own version of the white paper that explains why AI will be the primary political and social organizing strategy going forward.

我也會討論這個，每個都以這種方式形成一點。現在，多極半球堆棧中繪製得最清楚的三個是-可以識別為-是中國的，可以識別為BAT，Giovaldi的BAT堆棧防火牆，Baba Tencent，一種歐美加中-北美洲加上中美洲、澳大利亞、新西蘭、以色列，被 GAFA 堆棧認可，還有來自獨聯體國家的俄羅斯堆棧，這也是我們要討論的一個。當然還有拉丁美洲、非洲、中東，尤其是日本。顯然，民族主義和語言同源性在這裡發揮了作用，但我認為，它實際上並沒有像它看起來那樣解釋。我們還看到——在最近的一年裡，一種人工智能的擴散是地緣政治策略的一種明確形式，這些多極堆棧中的每一個都提供了他們自己版本的白皮書，解釋了為什麼人工智能將成為主要的政治和社會組織前進的戰略。

China has their white paper, Macron his, Putin eventually, and then Trump eventually managed to get one as well. So let me start then with the USA and Europe. Recent scandals, both real and imagined, relating to data privacy, breaches, misuse, mismodeling, have amplified calls to take back our data, taking data out of the hands of opaque global corporations and making it more public. Public, of course, could mean a lot of different things. European-style data privacy regulations may in time ultimately even enforce US regulations, or they may make EU into a kind of Galapagos jurisdiction.

中國有他們的白皮書，馬克龍有他的，普京最終有，然後特朗普最終也設法得到了一份。那麼讓我從美國和歐洲開始。最近與數據隱私、洩露、濫用、錯誤建模有關的真實和想像的醜聞，已經放大了收回我們數據的呼聲，將數據從不透明的全球公司手中奪走，並使其更加公開。當然，公開可能意味著很多不同的事情。歐洲式的數據隱私法規最終可能最終會執行美國的法規，或者它們可能會使歐盟成為一種加拉帕戈斯管轄區。

In short, take back our data, yes, we're supportive of this, but ultimately who do we mean by we and ultimately finally what is this data? This may be the start of a, I think, rather deeply important kind of transformation and understanding of the role of algorithmic systems as governing mechanisms, but it opens up much more difficult questions than some of our early answers are capable of addressing. First of all, data is not like a physical resource. It's not already there in some way. You don't gather data like you pick strawberries.

簡而言之，收回我們的數據，是的，我們支持這一點，但最終我們指的是誰，最終這些數據是什麼？我認為，這可能是一種非常重要的轉變和對算法系統作為管理機制的作用的理解的開始，但它提出的問題比我們早期的一些答案能夠解決的要困難得多。首先，數據不像物理資源。它在某種程度上還不存在。您不會像採摘草莓那樣收集數據。

The act of modeling data produces data in its first place. And so in many cases, the most interesting data, of course, is the derivative data that is produced, not the direct data. It's the models about data that is mostly not the raw data in its own sense. So a lot to discuss here, but what models of and for an algorithmic governance should we then constitute and pursue given these? There aren't simple answers to this, and I don't propose them, but it's certain that the populist enclosures of language are unlikely to be by chance the most viable discourse.

建模數據的行為首先會產生數據。所以在很多情況下，最有趣的數據當然是產生的衍生數據，而不是直接數據。它是關於數據的模型，從其本身的意義上講，這些數據大多不是原始數據。這裡有很多要討論的內容，但是鑑於這些，我們應該構建和追求什麼樣的算法治理模型？對此沒有簡單的答案，我也沒有提出它們，但可以肯定的是，語言的民粹主義圈地不太可能偶然成為最可行的話語。

There's, in the talk I gave at Trust a couple nights ago, we had a bit of a discussion as to even in many ways whether or not the understanding the use of data in this sort of sensing and gathering sense, whether or not the trope of surveillance is in fact a too narrow and specific concept and one that already forecloses a lot of the more interesting discussions around this as well. Now, all of that said, the concerns are valid and real and are born of a long overdue recognition that cloud platforms have absorbed many modern states and publics and while states themselves are co-evolving. The implications for politics and geopolitics are profound to say the least, but the conversation to date I think has failed to directly address what this new normal really could mean, and I think we need to rethink, in order to get there, rethink some pretty basic assumptions. Instead of reimposing old political maps directly onto platforms, we need to measure what has shifted and imagine and design what comes next, including what are the boundaries of a public in a platform, what could they be, what should they be. So that said, I have to say a couple words on the Facebook hearings.

在幾天前我在 Trust 的演講中，我們甚至在很多方面進行了一些討論，無論是在這種感知和收集意義上理解數據的使用，還是比喻監視實際上是一個過於狹隘和具體的概念，並且已經排除了圍繞它進行的許多更有趣的討論。現在，綜上所述，這些擔憂是真實存在的，並且源於一種遲來的認識，即云平台已經吸收了許多現代國家和公眾，而國家本身也在共同發展。至少可以說，這對政治和地緣政治的影響是深遠的，但我認為迄今為止的對話未能直接解決這種新常態的真正含義，我認為我們需要重新思考，為了到達那裡，重新思考一些非常好的基本假設。與其將舊的政治地圖直接重新強加到平台上，我們需要衡量已經發生的變化，想像和設計接下來會發生什麼，包括平台中公眾的邊界是什麼，他們可以是什麼，他們應該是什麼。所以說，我必須在 Facebook 聽證會上說幾句話。

Now, so many bad metaphors are crashing down around Facebook, and perhaps the worst one of these is community. That's not what Facebook does, nor are actual communities always so great in the first place, especially as idealized models for larger social forms. Communities can be quite lovely, as we see here today, but they can also be petty and small and normalizing. Autonomy's struggles with anonymity are just as important. So Facebook, a private company, public utility, with neither the accountability nor sovereignty to execute its own policy, nevertheless it tries to do so in a de facto way in multiple jurisdictions.

現在，許多糟糕的比喻都在 Facebook 周圍崩潰，其中最糟糕的一個可能是社區。這不是 Facebook 所做的，實際社區也不是一開始就那麼偉大，尤其是作為更大社會形式的理想化模型。社區可以非常可愛，正如我們今天在這裡看到的那樣，但它們也可以是瑣碎的、小的和規範化的。自治與匿名的鬥爭同樣重要。因此，Facebook 作為一家私營公司、公用事業公司，既沒有責任也沒有主權來執行自己的政策，但它試圖在多個司法管轄區以事實上的方式這樣做。

So now, Facebook is something I personally try to avoid, and its function as an amplification machine for idiotic populism is obvious, but at the same time, scapegoating is also a way of forestalling the more difficult discussions about what painful changes are necessary. So this year, Zuckerberg may be pazuzu, but at the hearings, give the impression that compared to the elected officials in the US Senate, at least he knows how to turn the thing on. So I would suggest that in a weird way, while Zuckerberg's performance clearly canceled any pipe dreams about his presidential candidacy for 2020, it may have done a lot for 2024, one observes with not a small bit of trepidation. People tend to vote for that certain something that they both hate and fear, but think they can't live without. Now, in terms of fixing Facebook, is the video playing?

所以現在，Facebook 是我個人試圖避免的東西，它作為愚蠢的民粹主義放大機器的作用是顯而易見的，但與此同時，找替罪羊也是一種阻止更艱難的討論是必要的痛苦改變的方式。所以今年，扎克伯格可能是 pazuzu，但在聽證會上，給人的印像是，與美國參議院的民選官員相比，至少他知道如何打開這件事。因此，我會以一種奇怪的方式建議，雖然扎克伯格的表現顯然打消了他在 2020 年總統候選人資格方面的任何白日夢，但它可能在 2024 年做了很多事情，有人帶著不小的恐懼觀察。人們傾向於投票給他們既討厭又害怕的某些東西，但他們認為沒有這些東西他們就活不下去。現在，就修復 Facebook 而言，視頻正在播放嗎？

No. Okay. I don't think there is a way to fix Facebook that would leave Facebook as anything like Facebook. I think the original sin of Facebook was designing a social network with the individual as the fundamental unit of analysis and composition. The presentation of self as the lens for the interactions that we make, see, and perform has led directly to the echoing cascade of recursive narcissism and apophenia that we find there. So instead, a platform disindividuation of the user position is the goal and means of what comes next.

不，好的。我不認為有一種方法可以修復 Facebook，讓 Facebook 像 Facebook 一樣。我認為 Facebook 的原罪在於設計了一個以個人為基本分析和組成單位的社交網絡。將自我呈現為我們進行、看到和執行的交互的鏡頭，直接導致了我們在那裡發現的遞歸自戀和精神錯亂的迴聲級聯。因此，取而代之的是，用戶位置的平台去個性化是接下來的目標和手段。

Also, I always find it a bit rich for the popular press to sound the alarm on how the media landscape creates narrow worldview echo chambers filled with moral panic feedback loops. That is to say, by all means, quit Facebook and cancel your account, but in really doing so is perhaps harder than we think. I think it also means to quit the tabloid politics and the hate clicking and the soft focus conspiracy theories. Besides, the internet as a whole is not really just about social media. That's the thing we see ourselves reflected in.

此外，我總是覺得大眾媒體對媒體格局如何創造充滿道德恐慌反饋循環的狹窄世界觀迴聲室發出警報有點豐富。也就是說，無論如何，退出 Facebook 並取消您的帳戶，但真正這樣做可能比我們想像的要難。我認為這也意味著退出小報政治、仇恨點擊和軟焦點陰謀論。此外，整個互聯網並不僅僅是社交媒體。這就是我們看到自己反映的東西。

Most of the internet and most of your and my relationship to the internet is out of sight. Most of it isn't about us in the initial way. But we shouldn't fool ourselves into thinking that by deleting one's account, we are also then removing the privileges and entitlements and engagements of the platform's operations, impacts, protections, and privileges. Taking your reflection of yourself offline, making it so that you can't see yourself anymore in the mirror, is not the same thing as the platform no longer constructing a vast supply chain of buffers around your IRL position. The more essential politics then is not just about the fabrication and modulation of self-image, but it is structural and infrastructural, and it's on the sidelines.

大多數互聯網以及您和我與互聯網的大部分關係都是看不見的。其中大部分與我們最初的方式無關。但我們不應該自欺欺人地認為，通過刪除一個人的帳戶，我們也將刪除平台運營、影響、保護和特權的特權和權利以及參與。將你自己的倒影離線，這樣你就再也看不到鏡子裡的自己了，這與平台不再圍繞你的 IRL 位置構建龐大的緩衝供應鍊是兩碼事。那時更重要的政治不僅僅是關於自我形象的捏造和調整，而是結構性和基礎性的，而且它處於次要地位。

But to the extent that self-image actually becomes a core unit of infrastructural production, then indeed this frame needs to be broken. Further kicking a bit on this individual as unit model problem, in other contexts we see a kind of—an understanding of the solution is in fact a fortification of autonomy as a goal in and of itself. Now obviously individual privacy is good, but it is not the same thing as the good. The Lockean homo economicus, the sanctity of the individual as a metaphysical centrality, so dear to the X-Men reading of Atlas Shrugged, provides I think an unreliable guidance. Facebook, of course, being where that individual as the core unit problem is re-fortified.

但就自我形象實際上成為基礎設施生產的核心單元而言，這個框架確實需要打破。進一步將這個個體作為單元模型問題，在其他情況下，我們看到一種——對解決方案的理解實際上是對自主性作為目標本身的強化。現在顯然個人隱私是好的，但它和好的不是一回事。洛克式的經濟人，個人的神聖性作為形而上學的中心，對 X 戰警閱讀阿特拉斯聳聳肩如此珍貴，提供了我認為不可靠的指導。當然，Facebook 正是以個人為核心單位的問題得到重新強化的地方。

Looking away from the USA, thankfully, many debates in Europe might contest, productively so, the terms of inclusion or exclusion from the—in a Euro-American stack, and what in fact those norms of inclusion may be if there is inclusion to happen at all. So GDPR laws are ones that would identify and codify the legal status of EU data, draw literal dotted lines from data center to data center regardless of where those are located. The EU digital single market, including the right of erasure, pseudonymization, data portability, et cetera, all quite sensible, may in time take on a gravity similar to that which was once afforded to the Euro and the ECM. Enforcement of course depends on what is meant by operating in, quote-unquote, a jurisdiction, and what counts as EU data, which will continue to be redefined by technologies of circumvention, top-down, bottom-up, and of course middle-out. While on this side of the Atlantic, it might seem that all of this is being fought in response to American dictates, on the other side, in North America, serious policy discussions, of course, have been scrapped in favor of telecoms.

遠離美國，值得慶幸的是，歐洲的許多辯論可能會富有成效地爭論包容或排除在歐美堆棧中的條款，以及如果包容髮生，這些包容規範實際上可能是什麼根本。因此 GDPR 法律將識別和編纂歐盟數據的法律地位，從數據中心到數據中心繪製文字虛線，無論這些數據位於何處。歐盟數字單一市場，包括刪除權、假名化、數據可移植性等，都非常明智，可能會及時呈現出類似於曾經賦予歐元和 ECM 的重力。執法當然取決於在一個司法管轄區內運營的含義，引用 - 不引用，以及什麼算作歐盟數據，這些數據將繼續被規避技術重新定義，自上而下，自下而上，當然還有中間 -出去。在大西洋的這一邊，似乎所有這一切都是為了響應美國的命令而進行的，而在另一邊，在北美，嚴肅的政策討論當然已經被取消，有利於電信。

So by the time the Democrats get the White House back, EU DSM regulations may be the default option in response to however many years of post-net neutrality deregulation. Or as the, you know, so island.eu may in time become a kind of weird Galapagos anomaly, a dark area in the planetary archive, or the model by which the others will follow. Now again, however, there are more thorny issues with building, again, on the individual that data subject, which doesn't necessarily have to be a person, I suppose, building on the individual as the beginning and end of the site by which these protections would work and of the social model that algorithmic governance would develop. For example, some such programs, including some at the forefront of the Take Back Our Data movement, which to be clear, I'm supportive of, thematize their work as to make, in terms of making data more public, argue that citizens, explicitly the term citizens, are the core actors. Citizen data for citizens.

因此，當民主黨重新入主白宮時，歐盟 DSM 法規可能會成為默認選項，以應對網絡中立後多年的放鬆管制。或者，你知道，所以 island.eu 可能會及時成為一種奇怪的加拉帕戈斯異常，行星檔案中的一個黑暗區域，或者其他人將效仿的模型。然而，現在又一次，有更多棘手的問題再次建立在數據主體的個人之上，我想這不一定是一個人，建立在個人之上作為網站的開始和結束這些保護措施將起作用，並且算法治理將發展出社會模型。例如，一些這樣的項目，包括一些處於「收回我們的數據」運動最前沿的項目，明確地說，我支持，將他們的工作主題化為使數據更加公開，爭辯說公民，明確地說，公民是核心行為者。公民的公民數據。

But citizens of what? Do the boundaries of citizenship align well to the boundary of data flows, what data flows are and what they do? Given the benefits of mobility and the controversies of migration, why refortify the legal border between citizen and non-citizen as the basic condition of such rights and responsibilities? At any moment, cities are full of non-citizens and non-residents. And so the model of how algorithmic governance may work needs to include them too and recognize their access to infrastructure and vice versa.

但是什麼公民？公民身份的邊界是否與數據流的邊界很好地對齊，數據流是什麼以及它們做什麼？鑑於流動的好處和移民的爭議，為什麼要重新強化公民與非公民之間的法律邊界作為這種權利和義務的基本條件？任何時候，城市都充滿了非公民和非居民。因此，算法治理如何運作的模型也需要將它們包括在內，並承認它們對基礎設施的訪問，反之亦然。

Secondly, for networks like Facebook, the problem is not only that they do bad stuff, but that they also take up the place where the good stuff should be going on. That is, they sit in the place where, they sit in the place of what it is that we should be doing. Their harm is not only what they cause, but also what they prevent. That is, there's other ways of thinking about big data, thick data, beyond even the immediate or premature optimization of existing interfaces and systems. One thing we were talking about this morning in our workshop is in terms of thinking big data in terms of notions of the archive.

其次，對於像 Facebook 這樣的網絡來說，問題不僅在於他們做壞事，而且他們還佔據了應該做好事的地方。也就是說，他們坐在我們應該做的地方。他們的傷害不僅是他們造成的，也是他們預防的。也就是說，除了對現有界面和系統的即時或過早優化之外，還有其他思考大數據、厚數據的方法。我們今天早上在研討會上談論的一件事是根據檔案的概念來思考大數據。

The archive is a kind of promise to the future to account for ourselves to unknowable moments of decision and judgment in the future. Social good in many races at any sort of large and complex scale requires data in order to work, health data being sort of the most obvious. And so it's not only about privacy, it's also about communalization. It's also about, not just about surveillance, it's also about the responsibility of the archive. Epidemiology, for example, deals with networks based on temporal and vectorial transformations, not by looking at one organism at a time.

檔案是一種對未來的承諾，讓我們在未來不可知的決策和判斷時刻交待我們自己。在許多種族中，任何大規模和復雜規模的社會公益都需要數據才能發揮作用，健康數據是最明顯的。因此，這不僅關乎隱私，還關乎社區化。這不僅與監視有關，還與檔案館的責任有關。例如，流行病學處理基於時間和矢量變換的網絡，而不是一次只觀察一個有機體。

In many respects, it's the slow analysis, the slow algorithmic governance that requires a longer term archive for it to work, that being able to model and design with a deep time of the future depends upon. I should also say, perhaps parenthetically, that many of the more, I think, sort of more interesting discussions and debates about how to design the infrastructural systems for what the stack to come should look like, for better or worse, are also happening inside some of these platforms themselves, and so we really should not overlook these debates or think that they're not happening in terms of work this as well. So back to North America for a moment. In the US and Canada, after all the Facebook scandals, the winds now blow for more state oversight of private cloud platforms, often to ensure that the information carried is not biased or socially malicious. This is not such a dumb idea, but there's a much longer and more complicated discussion to be had about the governance of algorithmic governance, but I think a clear sign of a myopically Western perspective is the rush to see the measure of pros and cons of state oversight of the Euro-American Internet as if the Chinese stack were not available as a relevant comparison or a model of what that might even mean or may not mean.

在許多方面，正是緩慢的分析、緩慢的算法治理需要更長期的存檔才能發揮作用，而能否在未來很長一段時間內進行建模和設計取決於這些。我還應該說，也許附帶說一下，我認為還有很多關於如何為未來堆棧的外觀設計基礎設施系統的更有趣的討論和辯論，無論是好是壞，也在內部發生其中一些平臺本身，所以我們真的不應該忽視這些辯論，或者認為它們在工作方面也沒有發生。所以暫時回到北美。在美國和加拿大，在經歷了所有 Facebook 醜聞之後，現在正在吹起對私有云平台進行更多國家監管的風，通常是為了確保所攜帶的信息沒有偏見或沒有社會惡意。這不是一個愚蠢的想法，但是關於算法治理的治理還有更長時間和更複雜的討論，但我認為西方短視的一個明顯跡像是急於看到算法的優缺點。國家對歐美互聯網的監督，就好像中國的堆棧無法作為相關的比較或可能意味著什麼或可能不意味著什麼的模型一樣。

Last year at the New Normal program, one of our research ships was to Shenzhen in Hong Kong, and we visited the Tencent's AI lab while we were there. So to tell you a little bit more on China, what is called in China the BAT stack, which is the acronym of course comes after Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent, is not only the layers of a stack system that's composed of different platform structures, it's also increasingly the means by which this structure and this data structure is kept protected from other platforms and tools and applications that are not part of its prescribed interoperability. So Skype, as you know, is blocked in China. LinkedIn is blocked in Russia. Kaspersky is blocked in China.

去年在新常態項目中，我們的一艘研究船去了香港的深圳，我們在那裡參觀了騰訊的人工智能實驗室。所以再多說一點中國的情況，在中國所謂的BAT棧，當然是百度、阿里巴巴、騰訊之後的首字母縮寫，不僅僅是由不同的平台結構組成的堆棧系統的層次，它也越來越多地成為保護這種結構和這種數據結構免受不屬於其規定的互操作性的其他平台、工具和應用程序影響的手段。所以 Skype，如你所知，在中國被屏蔽了。 LinkedIn 在俄羅斯被屏蔽。卡巴斯基在中國被封鎖。

You can't buy Huawei or Xiaomi phones in the U.S. So forth and so on. There's a way in which these are increasingly being weaponized, or not weaponized, but there's a sort of a prophylactic structure in relationship to each other, sometimes weaponized as well. Now in thinking of the Chinese model, we also have to be attendant to, of course, at the same time, this incredibly vibrant, sort of invibrant, practical craft culture around electronics and the ways in which the mediated urban conditions have been constructed in relationship to this, the device that we carry around with us, which as Armin suggested, is really not much of a phone anymore. We're also been, you know, anyone who's sort of an urbanist and interested in these kinds of questions, and particularly around the Chinese question, can't help but be fascinated by the emergence of QR codes as a kind of, we see them as a kind of evolutionary response on the behalf of the synthetic environment of the city to the presence of a new species that is the camera that is capable of reading these surfaces and making sense of it in ways that we can't as well. There's this conversation going on between the app and this coded surface that doesn't require us to be part of this as well.

你不能在美國購買華為或小米手機等等。有一種方式使它們越來越多地被武器化，或者沒有被武器化，但有一種相互關係的預防結構，有時也會被武器化。現在，在思考中國模式時，當然，我們還必須同時關注這種圍繞電子產品的令人難以置信的充滿活力、充滿活力、實用的工藝文化，以及在中國構建中介城市條件的方式。與此相關的是，正如 Armin 所建議的那樣，我們隨身攜帶的設備實際上已經不再是電話了。我們也是，你知道，任何對這類問題感興趣的城市主義者，特別是圍繞中國問題的人，都會情不自禁地被二維碼的出現所吸引，我們看到它們是代表城市綜合環境對新物種的存在的一種進化反應，這種新物種是能夠讀取這些表面並以我們無法做到的方式理解它們的相機。應用程序和這個編碼表面之間正在進行這種對話，不需要我們也參與其中。

And I think there's something rather profound in that kind of dynamic. We're also, of course, interested in both the real and imagined projects of social credit, which I assume you know a bit about within China. So, of course, China's ways of developing what we would take to be a normal, at least in the West, a kind of normal credit core structure, but also includes data on your positive or negative participation within society, things that you post online, your friend posts something online that's critical of the party, your score may go down as well. So all very black mirror, of course. The role of facial recognition as an essential feature of the urban scale structures of these kinds of systems, which is a way of kind of inversion of the, a different kind of inversion of the QR code dynamic.

而且我認為在這種動態中有一些相當深刻的東西。當然，我們也對真實的和想像中的社會信用項目感興趣，我想你在中國對此有所了解。所以，當然，中國發展我們認為是正常的方式，至少在西方，一種正常的信用核心結構，但也包括關於你積極或消極參與社會的數據，你在網上發布的東西，您的朋友在網上發布了批評聚會的內容，您的分數也可能會下降。當然，所有的鏡子都是非常黑的。面部識別作為城市尺度結構的一個本質特徵的作用，是這類系統的一種倒置方式，一種不同的二維碼動態倒置方式。

In other words, the city itself is really clearly instrumentalized as the core, as one of the key mediums of the Bat Stack itself, not just what happens in the glowing glass rectangle of the mobile, but a real kind of technical evolutionary dynamic in the Simondonian sense of this term, particularly related to machinic sensing, and in this sense a kind of ambient and distributed form of urban AI. Now anyone who would sort of unproblematically recommend the full court nationalization of stack systems and data systems should spend a little bit of time, not in turn with the public control and accountability, but maybe should spend a little bit of time perusing the various party apps that you can get in Chinese app stores, of which there are hundreds, all of which give you sort of daily homilies of dedication, reminding you to do things that are, that would be beneficial, sort of performance of your dutiful citizenship. Now at the same time, it's clear that what I think of as a Chinese stack is of course not just about end user applications, whether those are on the phones or in the city, it's really in many respects about logistics and material production. It's about the movements of objects and the automation of those assemblages and the objects as they move around the world that may or may not directly involve human end users in any normal sense. And the software that in many cases is some of the most interesting of this as well is not something that is, is that you carry around with you in your pocket, but there's app-based systems that are actually driving much more complex forms of hardware within assembly systems as a factory that we visited here as well.

換句話說，城市本身確實很明顯地被工具化為核心，作為蝙蝠堆本身的關鍵媒介之一，不僅僅是手機發光的玻璃矩形中發生的事情，而是一種真正的技術進化動態Simondonian 對這個術語的理解，特別是與機械傳感有關，從這個意義上說，它是一種環境和分佈式形式的城市 AI。現在，任何會毫無疑問地建議將堆棧系統和數據系統全面國有化的人都應該花一點時間，而不是依次進行公共控制和問責，但也許應該花一點時間仔細閱讀各方應用程序您可以在中國的應用程序商店中獲得，其中有數百家，所有這些應用程序都會為您提供一些日常的奉獻精神，提醒您做一些有益的事情，以履行您盡職盡責的公民身份。現在同時，很明顯，我所認為的中國堆棧當然不僅僅是終端用戶應用程序，無論是在手機上還是在城市中，它在很多方面都與物流和材料生產有關。它是關於物體的運動以及這些組合和物體在世界範圍內移動時的自動化，這可能會或可能不會直接涉及任何正常意義上的人類最終用戶。在許多情況下，軟件也是其中最有趣的部分，它不是你隨身攜帶在口袋裡的東西，而是基於應用程序的系統實際上正在驅動更複雜形式的硬件在組裝系統中，我們也參觀了這裡的工廠。

And so once more, one of the things that makes this stack particularly interesting is the ways in which it operates at an environmental and urban scale from the get-go. Okay, one of the other things that we're given this, that this emphasis on the kind of logistics and the assemblage line of continental supply chains in relationship to the China stack, one of the things that we researched last year with some interest was not only Sino-Russian relations, but more specifically as part of the speculative megastructure module, the Belt and Road Initiative, which you're probably familiar with, which kind of like SuperStudio's continuous monument is both real and not real at the same time. As you know, it would be this enormous interlocking network of networks of flows between China into East Africa, into Russia, and into Europe, kind of huge new silk road as it's sold. So our interest in this is threefold, really. One is that if you take all of these different ports and roads and everything as a single meta-machine, as it's being narrated around, it would be the biggest work of design happening to date, and of course it's of interest in this way.

因此，讓這個堆棧特別有趣的事情之一是它從一開始就在環境和城市規模上運作的方式。好的，我們得到的另一件事是，強調與中國堆棧相關的大陸供應鏈的物流和裝配線，我們去年感興趣的研究之一是不僅是中俄關係，更具體地說，作為投機性巨型結構模塊的一部分，「一帶一路」倡議，你可能很熟悉，這有點像 SuperStudio 的連續紀念碑，既真實又不真實。如你所知，這將是中國到東非、俄羅斯和歐洲之間巨大的相互關聯的流動網絡，就像它出售的巨大的新絲綢之路一樣。所以我們對此的興趣是三方面的，真的。一個是，如果你把所有這些不同的港口和道路以及所有東西都當作一個單一的元機器，正如它所講述的那樣，這將是迄今為止最大的設計工作，當然它以這種方式很有趣。

In fact, a lot of the roads and a lot of the workways go through former Soviet republics, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and so as a kind of rotation within the Eurasian geopolitics, it has a tremendous degree of importance, and through the region, and through all of this as well, including China's relation with India, India being the country that is most against the Belt and Road Initiative, partially because China's making so much investment in Pakistan as part of this as well, though in many maps, China still includes India as being part of the Belt and Road because it allows them to add another billion participants to the story. But the last part of it in many ways that's sort of interesting is again the fact that it kind of doesn't exist, that it's a story, it's a narrative about a kind of hyperstitial infrastructure that's going to happen, like there's this port and this road and if you imagine them as all one big machine, then it's a giant kind of structure, and this narrativization of the infrastructure in fact mobilizes the capitalization, mobilizes participation and investment, it's a work of state-scale speculative design at this infrastructural scale. So in many respects, it's almost become a kind of convention to think about the futures of these systems in this new kind of stack-level Cold War between the GAFA and the Bad Stack, and of course it's really not at all that simple. There's many others that sort of have to work. And so Russia, where we—in Moscow, where our program is located, has its own sort of different version of this as well.

事實上，很多道路和工程都經過前蘇聯加盟共和國、土庫曼斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、哈薩克斯坦等，作為歐亞地緣政治中的一種輪換，它具有巨大的重要性，並通過該地區，以及所有這一切，包括中國與印度的關係，印度是最反對「一帶一路」倡議的國家，部分原因是中國在巴基斯坦進行了大量投資，這也是其中的一部分，儘管在許多地圖上，中國仍然將印度列為「一帶一路」的一部分，因為它允許他們在這個故事中再增加 10 億參與者。但它的最後一部分在很多方面都很有趣，它又是一個事實，它有點不存在，它是一個故事，它是關於一種將要發生的超級基礎設施的敘述，就像有這個港口和這條路，如果你把它們想像成一台大機器，那麼它就是一種巨大的結構，這種基礎設施的敘事化實際上動員了資本化，動員了參與和投資，這是一種國家規模的投機設計在這種基礎設施上的工作規模。所以在很多方面，在 GAFA 和 Bad Stack 之間的這種新型堆棧級冷戰中思考這些系統的未來幾乎成為一種約定俗成，當然它真的沒有那麼簡單。還有很多其他的必須工作。因此，在我們所在的俄羅斯，我們的項目所在的莫斯科，也有自己的不同版本。

It has its own speculative megastructures. Look, I'll just tell this story real quick. Right across the street from us, or across the river from us in Moscow, is the site of what was going to be the original palace of the Soviets. You remember this drawing here, these schemes here as well, with this King Kong-sized linen on top, which was going to be the biggest building in the world. They knocked down an Orthodox cathedral there, which would build this, had the big competition.

它有自己的投機巨型結構。聽著，我很快就會講這個故事。就在我們街對面，或者在莫斯科與我們隔河相望，是蘇聯最初宮殿的所在地。你記得這裡的這幅畫，還有這裡的這些方案，上面有金剛尺寸的亞麻布，這將成為世界上最大的建築。他們推倒了那裡的東正教大教堂，這將建造這個，進行了激烈的競爭。

They built the foundation for it, this huge circular foundation for the site, but then World War II broke out and decided, you know what, we need the steel for the war. We can't afford to build this giant thing anymore. But they had already built this huge, enormous circular foundation, so they said, all right, fine, we'll just make a giant public swimming pool. So for most of the 20th century, instead of being a monument to world socialism, it was an enormous public swimming pool, which in a way may be a better monument to world socialism nevertheless. Then when the church came back into power with Putin, they said, we want our, we would like that cathedral back.

他們為它打了地基，這個巨大的圓形地基，但是第二次世界大戰爆發了，你知道嗎，我們需要鋼鐵來打仗。我們再也負擔不起建造這個巨大的東西了。但是他們已經建好了這個巨大的圓形地基，所以他們說，好吧，好吧，我們就做一個巨大的公共游泳池。因此，在 20 世紀的大部分時間裡，它不是世界社會主義的紀念碑，而是一個巨大的公共游泳池，從某種意義上說，它可能是世界社會主義更好的紀念碑。然後當普京重新掌權時，他們說，我們想要我們的，我們想要那個大教堂回來。

And so they built this historical simulationist version of this, of the original cathedral, but bigger, right across the river from us, which looks like it's several hundred years old, but it's actually about 20 years old. This is the cathedral, by the way, that Pussy Riot did their infamous performance in, and when they did so, they were older than this building. So in a way, this site, especially this kind of great leap backwards, is, there's a lot of the Russian story in this location as well. Now, to the Russian stack, a lot of the rhetorics around the stacks, both inside of Russia and outside of it, seem to be drawn in one way or another around the issues of contamination and sort of keeping things in and out and kind of immunological models are quite strong, as is in certain extents notions of, in weird ways, there's a lot of things to do with technologies in Russia, to do with the, with the occult. Those of you who are interested in a kind of nice Wikipedia hole to fall into should look up the Nuoscope, which if you can't see the diagram here as well, but it was a plan by a character named Anton Vaino, and you can see from the look on Putin's face exactly how seriously he may have taken this as well.

所以他們建造了這個歷史模擬版本，原始大教堂，但更大，就在我們的河對岸，看起來有幾百年的歷史，但實際上大約有 20 年的歷史。順便說一句，Pussy Riot 曾在這座大教堂進行過臭名昭著的表演，當他們這樣做時，他們比這座建築還古老。所以在某種程度上，這個網站，尤其是這種巨大的倒退，在這個地方也有很多俄羅斯故事。現在，對於俄羅斯的煙囪來說，俄羅斯境內外的許多關於菸囪的言論似乎都以這樣或那樣的方式圍繞著污染問題和某種程度上的進進出出以及某種程度上免疫學模型非常強大，在某種程度上，以奇怪的方式，俄羅斯的技術與神秘學有很多關係。那些對某種不錯的維基百科漏洞感興趣的人應該查看 Nuoscope，如果你在這裡也看不到圖表，但這是一個名叫 Anton Vaino 的角色的計劃，你可以從普京臉上的表情可以看出他對此事的重視程度。

But you see this, you've got, you know, concept of truth is based into mind and daily events and aberrations. So as a kind of functional specification structure, there's quite a lot going on here to sort of unpack. Now, in roughly speaking, we could, the Russian stack doesn't have a nice acronym, there's not enough vowels to work itself out, but we've got mail.ru, yandex, VK, telegram, Instagram around here as well, at least before, as we say, before Russia is reabsorbed into the Estonian Empire, as they have a lot going on. But what, in general, what we're beginning to see is produce a kind of retroactive firewall, where China had sort of circumscribed its barrier locations within this Westphalian border and took and produced very specific strategic choke points by which deep packet inspection could sort of work, going through it like the gateways in the moat into a city. Russia's trying to do this retroactively and not with a whole lot of success.

但是你看到這個，你知道，真理的概念是基於思想和日常事件和偏差。因此，作為一種功能規範結構，這裡有很多東西可以進行拆包。現在，粗略地說，我們可以，俄語堆棧沒有一個很好的首字母縮寫詞，沒有足夠的元音來自行解決，但我們這裡也有 mail.ru、yandex、VK、telegram、Instagram，至少在我們所說的之前，在俄羅斯重新併入愛沙尼亞帝國之前，因為他們有很多事情要做。但是，總的來說，我們開始看到的是產生一種追溯防火牆，中國在威斯特伐利亞邊界內限制了它的屏障位置，並採取並產生了非常具體的戰略瓶頸，深度數據包檢查可以通過這些點進行分類工作，像護城河中的門戶一樣穿過它進入城市。俄羅斯試圖追溯這樣做，但沒有取得很大的成功。

When we were in Hong Kong and Shenzhen on the research trip, for reasons that are a bit complicated, Russia tried to shut down telegram. Now, inside Russia, telegram is the dominant messaging app by far. All work happens on telegram, which was originally a Russian company, and it sort of moved out. So Russia tried to shut telegram down. Telegram then moved their location from Google servers to Amazon servers and sort of got chased around on these servers.

我們在香港和深圳調研的時候，因為比較複雜的原因，俄羅斯試圖關閉telegram。現在，在俄羅斯國內，telegram 是迄今為止占主導地位的消息應用程序。所有的工作都發生在 telegram 上，它最初是一家俄羅斯公司，後來搬走了。所以俄羅斯試圖關閉電報。然後，Telegram 將他們的位置從谷歌服務器轉移到亞馬遜服務器，並在這些服務器上被追逐。

Meanwhile, the federal government is trying to shut down those servers, shutting down IP access, they're inducing, they're shutting down access to the Google Docs structures that the whole country works on. Okay, so this is Pavel Durov, who is the CEO of telegram, who knows how to play the game of Russian social media. This largely involves taking your shirt off and riding a bear or something like this as well. And so he's basically saying, you know, bring it on, we're going to go for this as well. So one of the, and so they had these campaigns where people threw paper airplanes out the windows and all the rest of this is, but one of the really interesting things that happened, both while we were gone and when we came back, that people were sort of telling me about was that what were the end result of this, and you can still use telegram in Russia, by the way, for the most part, especially on your phone, is that everyone basically taught each other how to use VPNs. And so, you know, your grandma who you were talking to on telegram, you go to your grandma's house and you show her how to install VPN and how to use the VPN.

與此同時，聯邦政府正試圖關閉這些服務器，關閉 IP 訪問，他們正在誘導，他們正在關閉對整個國家正在使用的 Google Docs 結構的訪問。好的，這就是 Telegram 的首席執行官 Pavel Durov，他知道如何玩俄羅斯社交媒體遊戲。這主要涉及脫掉你的襯衫並騎熊或類似的東西。所以他基本上是說，你知道，開始吧，我們也將為此努力。所以其中一個，所以他們開展了這些活動，人們將紙飛機扔出窗外，其餘的都是，但是發生的一件非常有趣的事情，無論是我們離開還是回來的時候，人們有點告訴我這的最終結果是什麼，你仍然可以在俄羅斯使用電報，順便說一下，在大多數情況下，尤其是在你的手機上，每個人基本上都在互相教如何使用 VPN .所以，你知道，你在電報上與之交談的祖母，你去你祖母家，向她展示如何安裝 VPN 以及如何使用 VPN。

So the end result of all of this is that uses of VPNs in Russia quadrupled in about two weeks. Again, with the great leap backwards of this as well. Okay. Let me then move to some more general points. Ultimately at stake for this is the governance, not just of data, but really of value of information for some, but the value of that information signifies.

因此，所有這一切的最終結果是，俄羅斯的 VPN 使用量在大約兩週內翻了兩番。同樣，這也是一個巨大的倒退。好的。然後讓我談談一些更一般的觀點。最終危在旦夕的是治理，不僅僅是數據，而且對某些人來說，信息的真正價值，但信息的價值意味著。

And how we model this and how we understand this is not always so clear. Is Bitcoin going up versus the dollar or is the dollar going down against Bitcoin? We'll see. In terms of the stack and this, the multipolar hemispherical stack thesis, this re-territorialization of bounded geographic hemispheres, which is not the same as the Westphalian necessarily, re-engineered and remodeled this quasi-sovereign interlocking platforms. The borders of which has said, track the circumscription of what it is, each of these stack, the data that each of these stacks is able to sense, how it's able to index this, is right to index this, its capacity to make models of that data and to produce simulations from those models, which it uses to in fact govern the world that it believes it has control over.

我們如何對此建模以及我們如何理解這一點並不總是那麼清楚。比特幣兌美元上漲還是美元兌比特幣下跌？我們拭目以待。就堆棧而言，多極半球堆棧理論，這種有界地理半球的重新領土化，不一定與威斯特伐利亞相同，重新設計和改造了這個準主權互鎖平台。邊界已經說過，跟踪它的邊界，這些堆棧中的每一個，這些堆棧中的每一個能夠感知的數據，它如何能夠索引它，索引它是正確的，它製作模型的能力這些數據並從這些模型中產生模擬，它實際上用來管理它認為它可以控制的世界。

And again, these are not all contiguous, as we would include Australia, for example, in the anglophonic stack and so forth. Now, the danger, of course, in any model such as this, at this scale where you're able to, no matter how much data is being modeled, it's being modeled through, it's being produced through particular kinds of schema. And the tendency of any complex system at this level is to reduce, is to attempt to reduce reality to the level of complexity that the control system is capable of thinking with, to reduce reality to the level of complexity the control system is able, is thinking with. And so almost inevitably, each of these hemispherical stacks as a model system becomes and based upon a certain kind of Potemkin ontology, a way in which it believes the world to work and governing the world through those premises, regardless of how fragile they in fact may be. Its capacity to produce pattern and organization is, always will come with a tendency of apophenic, apophenic structures of this as well.

同樣，這些並不都是連續的，因為我們會將澳大利亞包括在英語堆棧中等等。現在，當然，在任何像這樣的模型中，在你能夠做到的這種規模下，無論有多少數據被建模，它都是通過特定類型的模式進行建模，它是通過特定類型的模式生成的。在這個層次上任何復雜系統的趨勢是減少，是試圖將現實減少到控制系統能夠思考的複雜程度，將現實減少到控制系統能夠思考的複雜程度，是思考著。因此，幾乎不可避免地，每個作為模型系統的半球形堆棧都成為並基於某種波將金本體論，一種相信世界通過這些前提運作和治理世界的方式，無論它們實際上多麼脆弱或許。它產生模式和組織的能力是，總是會伴隨著一種趨勢，這種結構也是如此。

This bio, I should speak this way as well, right after the stack was published, Der Spiegel published a cache of Wikileaks leaks, and in one of the decks that one of the, from one of these leaks as well, it turns out the NSA has their own stack theory as well. They almost got it right. They have the, this as well, but we'll hopefully can correct this. So while certain affective expressions of sovereignty, representations of self-mastery, dignification, solidarity, and so forth, can of course be their own reward, they also animate structural vacillations which are both can be coherent or incoherent between wall building, encapsulation, and expansive mobilization, and the dynamics between those. So assuming that the arcs of hominid migration are unstoppable, other than by the most extreme means, we recognize that borders don't always, don't only cleave, but they, but like all interfaces, they also perform a, they also have a generative function as well.

這個生物，我也應該這樣說，在堆棧發布後，Der Spiegel 發布了 Wikileaks 洩漏的緩存，並且在其中一個甲板上，從其中一個洩漏中，結果是NSA 也有自己的堆棧理論。他們幾乎做對了。他們也有這個，但我們希望能糾正這個問題。因此，雖然某些主權的情感表達，自我控制、尊嚴、團結等的表現，當然可以成為他們自己的獎勵，但它們也激發了結構上的搖擺不定，這些搖擺不定在築牆、封裝和廣泛的動員，以及它們之間的動態。所以假設原始人遷徙的弧線是不可阻擋的，除了通過最極端的手段，我們認識到邊界並不總是，不僅分裂，而且它們，但像所有界面一樣，它們也執行一個，它們也有生成函數也是如此。

Island ecologies produce unique species. For the membranes of any particular assemblage cohere and incorporate bodies through inclusion as much as exclusion, but which bodies and why so? Which designs on interiorization versus exteriorization matter most for the future of political geography? So we observe both secessionist withdrawal into traditional territories, as well as consolidations of much larger swaths into these hemispherical domains, stacked domains. We see the continuing expansions of de facto sovereignties of cloud platforms, as well as the reformation of traditional states into regional platforms.

島嶼生態產生獨特的物種。因為任何特定組合的膜通過包含和排斥來凝聚和合併身體，但是哪些身體以及為什麼這樣呢？內部化與外部化的哪種設計對政治地理學的未來最重要？因此，我們觀察到分離主義者撤退到傳統領土，以及更大範圍的合併到這些半球形域、堆疊域中。我們看到雲平台實際主權的持續擴張，以及傳統國家向區域平台的改革。

So what near-term developments are most likely? Perhaps through more radical abstractions of sovereignty, we can anticipate things like states largely depopulated of people. Such jurisdictions of convenience may look like robotic port cities along the Arctic Sea, or like Syria, where Assad seems to have sorted out that he doesn't actually need a population in order to have a country. It may prove easier to not have civilians at all, just pay an army to protect the sovereign wealth of industrial resources without the nuisance of a larger society. The living corollary of such empty legal entities may be the informal shadow economies by which some estimates count for as much as one-fifth of the global economy.

那麼近期最有可能出現哪些發展呢？或許通過更激進的主權抽象，我們可以預見到諸如人口大量減少的國家之類的事情。這種便利的管轄區可能看起來像北冰洋沿岸的機器人港口城市，或者像敘利亞，阿薩德似乎已經弄清楚他實際上不需要人口來擁有一個國家。事實證明，完全沒有平民可能更容易，只需支付一支軍隊來保護工業資源的主權財富，而無需更大社會的滋擾。這種空洞的法律實體的必然結果可能是非正式的影子經濟，據估計，這種經濟佔全球經濟的五分之一。

The former is a state economy without a people, the latter is a social economy without a state, both of which are dark and probably interdependent circumventions of the order of things. So when such novelties appear, well, so at the same time some novelties appear initially interesting for one reason but prove uninteresting for another. But when they do, they may prove important for other reasons still. When Denmark's digital ambassador suggests that his country's relations with Google are as important as with any other state, we shouldn't smirk too hard, nor take this as necessarily bad news. Blockchains could be or should be interesting if they were to open up the economic user position beyond Lockian individualism, not because they reinforce its illusions, and yet they seem to do the opposite.

前者是沒有人民的國家經濟，後者是沒有國家的社會經濟，兩者都是黑暗的，可能是相互依存的對事物秩序的規避。因此，當出現此類新奇事物時，嗯，同時，某些新奇事物最初出於某種原因看起來很有趣，但由於另一種原因而變得無趣。但是當他們這樣做時，他們可能仍然出於其他原因被證明是重要的。當丹麥的數字大使表示他的國家與穀歌的關係與與任何其他國家的關係一樣重要時，我們不應該假笑得太厲害，也不應該將這視為必然的壞消息。如果區塊鏈要在洛克式個人主義之外打開經濟用戶的位置，那麼它可能或應該很有趣，而不是因為它們強化了它的幻想，但它們似乎適得其反。

Estonia's social democratic models of algorithmic governance or e-residence program may be interesting not because they allow you to pay taxes in Baltic states you've never been to, but because they suggest that there is no imperative link between the distributed provision of state social services and legal state jurisdictions. The geographic walls that sort citizens from a wilderness of non-citizens become taller and wider as they become less and less necessary. Formal state citizen itself could be as mobile or indeed as gradient and non-binary as Keller was discussing last night, as it wants to be. This may prove important, for example, to any broad-based UBI, universal basic income programs, especially those based on Pagovian taxes, because there's a real danger in UBI that as wealthy jurisdictions offer this baseline dividend, then the prophylactic divisions between who's in and who's out will be more stark, portending transgenerational partitions of tiered levels of citizenship, such as in March of this year, of last year, when Italy's five-star movement peddled its own version of UBI in proximity to its fuzzy Italians first platform. So put differently, UBI that delinks basic living costs from the distortion of labor price signals is a good thing, would open a cascade of kind of vibrancy, we assume, at least in the abstract.

愛沙尼亞的算法治理或電子居住計劃的社會民主模型可能很有趣，不是因為它們允許你在你從未去過的波羅的海國家納稅，而是因為它們表明國家社會的分佈式供應之間沒有必然聯繫服務和合法的州管轄權。將公民與非公民的荒野區分開來的地理隔離牆變得越來越高，越來越寬，因為它們變得越來越沒有必要。正式的國家公民本身可以像凱勒昨晚討論的那樣流動，或者確實像梯度和非二進制一樣，正如它想要的那樣。這可能被證明很重要，例如，對於任何基礎廣泛的 UBI、普遍基本收入計劃，尤其是那些基於 Pagovian 稅收的計劃，因為 UBI 存在真正的危險，因為富裕的司法管轄區提供這種基線紅利，那麼誰在誰之間進行預防性劃分誰出局將更加明顯，預示著公民等級的跨代劃分，例如今年 3 月和去年，當時意大利的五星級運動在其模糊的意大利人第一個平台附近兜售自己的 UBI 版本。因此換句話說，UBI 將基本生活成本與勞動力價格信號的扭曲脫鉤是一件好事，我們假設至少在抽像上會開啟一連串的活力。

That is, as the cascading impacts of automation of various labor sectors and the people that comprise them may lead to the necessity of ameliorative dividends, such as UBI, this may also harden the distinctions between formal citizens on the inside who would receive such payments and those on the outside looking in who would not. So instead of alleviating the extreme disparities of wealth and security, UBI may misapply as welfare chauvinism may lock them in and accelerate them. Now, genuine confusion, ambivalence, ambiguities over the political, legal, and philosophical status of automation and robotics and AI and so forth, I think should inspire fewer calls then for a normative re-humanization and more recognition and invention of the agency of irregular and non-anthropomorphic systems, carbon-based or otherwise. And it does seem to me, I have to say, that in many cases when we hear sort of concern and hand-wringing and teeth-gnashing about how humans are being replaced by machines, it tends to be male critics making the most outraged calls. In certain ways, it seems that feminists already know or not so panicked about, already know that we've always been cyborgs, unless panicked about replacement is the real issue.

也就是說，由於各個勞動部門及其組成人員的自動化的級聯影響可能導致改善紅利（例如 UBI）的必要性，這也可能會加強內部正式公民之間的區別，他們將獲得此類付款，那些在外面看的人不會。因此，UBI 不會緩解財富和安全的極端差距，而是可能會誤用，因為福利沙文主義可能會鎖定並加速它們。現在，關於自動化、機器人技術和人工智能等的政治、法律和哲學地位的真正混亂、矛盾和模棱兩可，我認為應該會激發更少的呼籲，然後再呼籲規範的重新人性化，更多地承認和發明非正規機構和非擬人系統，碳基或其他。在我看來，我不得不說，在很多情況下，當我們聽到關於人類如何被機器取代的擔憂、痛苦和咬牙切齒時，往往是男性批評家發出最憤怒的呼籲.在某些方面，女權主義者似乎已經知道或不那麼恐慌，已經知道我們一直都是電子人，除非對替代感到恐慌才是真正的問題。

Estonia, of course, has its own CRAT laws, which are their legal structure for the agencies of AI, and yet, which is interesting, we have speaking at an event we do later this month, and instead, however, we all sit through various doomsaying professional trolls yelling at the cloud. Also on that same playlist are meme-chasing, tide-riding journalists promoting team-human campaigns, thereby taking an already problematic notion of human rights on a diluted reactionary turn towards a kind of resentful connotations of species privilege. Now, all this said, what some call techno-optimism, I think, is rightly criticized for its breathlessly positive investments of faith in quick technological fixes to complex conditions and painful histories, while such populist movements, humanist exceptionalism or humanist fundamentalism as well, in their most garish forms, exhibit a similar kind of impatience of revolutionaries, as it's called, and offer instead, I think, equally breathless quick political fixes or ritual gestures of self-affirmation, where something like engagement should be. So for our own grasshopper lies heavy moment, states trade on dubious historical claims, geographic, ethnic, linguistic, in order to enforce new influences on land and in the cloud. The amalgamation of states' vertical integration and the cloud's power law dynamic is steering toward fundamentalist sovereignties in a narrowing of the political discourse, but not of the underlying spectrum of positions which could be articulated.

愛沙尼亞當然有自己的 CRAT 法，這是他們針對 AI 機構的法律結構，然而，有趣的是，我們在本月晚些時候舉辦的一次活動中發表了演講，然而，相反，我們都坐下來各種末日論專業巨魔對著雲大喊大叫。在同一個播放列表中，還有追逐迷因、追趕潮流的記者推動團隊人類運動，從而將本已存在問題的人權概念淡化反動轉向一種令人反感的物種特權內涵。現在，綜上所述，我認為一些人稱之為技術樂觀主義的東西受到了正確的批評，因為它對快速技術修復複雜情況和痛苦歷史的信念進行了令人窒息的積極投資，而這些民粹主義運動、人道主義例外主義或人道主義原教旨主義，在他們最花哨的形式中，表現出一種類似革命者的不耐煩，正如它所說的那樣，相反，我認為，提供同樣令人喘不過氣來的快速政治修復或自我肯定的儀式姿態，而應該是參與之類的東西。因此，對於我們自己的蚱蜢來說，這是一個沉重的時刻，國家在可疑的歷史主張、地理、種族、語言上進行交易，以便在陸地和雲端施加新的影響。國家的垂直整合和雲的冪律動態的結合正在縮小政治話語的範圍內轉向原教旨主義主權，而不是可以明確表達的潛在立場範圍。

That is, this outcome is not inevitable. Its vision of how things actually work is inaccurate and so vulnerable. In short, it holds that entities exist first as things, as bodies situated, and then subsequently interaction among those parts may ensue, this way or that. And in different ways, this misapprehension is held for different reasons by some triple-O acolytes too, but that's a different story. Now for this view, then, internal relations of a social body precede the internal relations in this incorrect imagery, precede in time and value any external or transitive relations that the polity may enter into, quote-unquote, in some adjacent or subsequent place.

也就是說，這種結果並非不可避免。它對事物實際運作方式的看法是不准確的，而且非常脆弱。簡而言之，它認為實體首先作為事物存在，作為被安置的身體，然後隨後這些部分之間的相互作用可能會以這種或那種方式發生。並且以不同的方式，這種誤解也被一些 triple-O 助手出於不同的原因持有，但這是一個不同的故事。那麼，對於這種觀點，社會團體的內部關係先於這種不正確的意像中的內部關係，在時間上和價值上先於政體可能在某個相鄰或後續位置進入的任何外部或過渡關係。

Instead, we should see the productive function of membranes to give shape and form, to draw exit and entrance, to compose differentiation and polypolarity of cultures that are always already in motion. We would spend less time attending to an over-determined placefulness than to the trophic cascades of discontinuous polities located not in one location at a time, but across sites and situations, across oceans, and between molecules, with real atmospheric effects. This reactionary moment also stems, as I think, from an inability of the West, quote-unquote, to account for the entropic forces that it helps set in motion, but which have now have far less need of its privileged steerage. It's like a cell whose walls have burst and which now swims in its own osmotic churn. We need to be very careful, I think, about the descriptions we use of this moment and should assume that some neologisms are in order.

相反，我們應該看到膜的生產功能，可以賦予形狀和形式，繪製出口和入口，構成始終處於運動狀態的文化的分化和多極化。與關注不連續政體的營養級聯相比，我們花更少的時間關註一個過度確定的場所，這些政體不是一次位於一個位置，而是跨越地點和情況，跨越海洋，在分子之間，具有真正的大氣效應。我認為，這一反動時刻還源於西方無力解釋它幫助啟動的熵力，但現在西方對它的特權指導的需求要少得多。它就像一個細胞，它的壁已經破裂，現在在它自己的滲透攪動中游動。我認為，我們需要非常小心地使用我們對這個時刻的描述，並且應該假設一些新詞是正確的。

That is, some are quick to call this predicament proto-fascist, but I find this term both imprecise and disappointingly Eurocentric, once again mistaking the local particular past for a global unknowable future. Does over-employing the F-word presume that Europe's past is the default measure for everyone else's future? It is the best term if you think that Europe is actually the center of history and that history is a closed loop, not just for any eternal return, but a quite particular one. Instead, we might ask for what do Xi Jinping's consider consolidations of power count? In what way is he and is he not a populist?

也就是說，有些人很快將這種困境稱為原始法西斯主義，但我發現這個詞既不精確又令人失望地以歐洲為中心，再次將當地特定的過去誤認為是全球不可知的未來。過度使用 F 詞是否假定歐洲的過去是其他所有人未來的默認衡量標準？如果你認為歐洲實際上是歷史的中心並且歷史是一個閉環，不只是為了任何永恆的回歸，而是一種非常特殊的回歸，那麼這是最好的說法。相反，我們可能會問，習近平認為鞏固權力算什麼？他以何種方式不是民粹主義者？

That is, what's coming may be horrible, authoritarian, catastrophic, or may actually be far better than what we have now, but it will not necessarily be Western in character. And so decisively unlinking universalism from its European vernaculars, a real provincialization of Europe, is something the left can find as difficult to fathom as the right, though for different reasons. I suspect and hope that the current wave of consolidation around legacy territories is a transitional interruption of the longer arc towards truly planetary polities, plural. And in whatever form, quote, we take, humans are and should remain an unapologetically migratory species. Territories defined by geologically very recent occupation and or divine archaeology and vice versa can always be fortified, but to what end?

也就是說，即將到來的可能是可怕的、獨裁的、災難性的，或者實際上可能比我們現在擁有的要好得多，但它不一定是西方的。如此果斷地將普世主義與其歐洲方言脫鉤，歐洲真正的地方化，左派和右派一樣難以理解，儘管出於不同的原因。我懷疑並希望，當前圍繞遺留領土的整合浪潮是對真正全球政治、多元政治的長期弧線的過渡中斷。無論以何種形式，引用我們的觀點，人類現在是而且應該仍然是一個毫無歉意的遷徙物種。由地質上最近的佔領和/或神聖考古學界定的領土，反之亦然，總是可以加固，但目的是什麼？

In the coming years, the discontiguous megaterritories that consolidate alternative sovereign domains, including hemispherical stacks, hold the potential for Galapagos effects that may force new paths of productive diversification, new bridges, passages, and teeming avenues between them. Finally leaving the 20th century, I prefer to see these as another episode of anthropogenic integration, not its meltdown. And so then just a couple points of conclusion. To mobilize design on behalf of conditions that are not yet existing here and now, I think we have not shed nearly enough of local social histories mooring privilege, including the social divisions that allow for such tiny air pockets such as this floating university, in which a few of us may contemplate models that are otherwise one-dimensional. Recently I spoke with a colleague, someone known in the art and speculative philosophy circles, who is involved in his own way in an ongoing project of theorizing the Anthropocene, and I was a bit alarmed by how much for him and some of the inverse conclusion was in fact taken for granted.

在未來幾年，整合替代主權領域（包括半球堆疊）的不連續巨型領土具有加拉帕戈斯效應的潛力，這可能會迫使生產多樣化的新路徑、新的橋樑、通道和它們之間的擁擠途徑。終於離開 20 世紀，我更願意將這些視為人為融合的另一集，而不是它的崩潰。因此，只有幾點結論。為了代表此時此地尚不存在的條件動員設計，我認為我們還沒有擺脫足夠的地方社會歷史停泊特權，包括允許像這所浮動大學這樣的微小氣穴的社會分化，其中我們中的一些人可能會考慮一維的模型。最近我與一位同事交談，他在藝術和思辨哲學界享有盛名，他以自己的方式參與了一項正在進行的人類世理論化項目，我對他的貢獻和一些相反的結論感到有點震驚事實上被認為是理所當然的。

In short, he repeated quite generally that the anthropogenic model of the Anthropocene is a model of a single-dimensional world, and that it is a model of a single-dimensional world. In short, he repeated quite joyfully, as if obvious, that the root cause of our ethical ecological malaise were opaque, mystical, planetary hyper-objects and withdrawn conspiratorial hyper-processes. And so for him, the work of art and design under such circumstances is to re-render these sprawling systems at a phenomenologically intuitive human scale, to re-bind ecology and not only socio-historical time but psychological time in this way. This is what localism means, he says. The purpose of doing so, he said, is not only so that people can understand them in regular terms, but that their abominably inhuman scope can be reformed.

簡而言之，他非常籠統地重複了人類世的人類模型是一個單維世界的模型，而且它是一個單維世界的模型。簡而言之，他非常高興地重複著，似乎顯而易見，我們道德生態問題的根本原因是不透明的、神秘的、行星超客體和退縮的陰謀超過程。因此對他來說，這種情況下的藝術和設計工作就是在現象學上直觀的人類尺度上重新渲染這些龐大的系統，以這種方式重新綁定生態，不僅是社會歷史時間，還有心理時間。他說，這就是地方主義的意思。他說，這樣做的目的不僅是為了讓人們能夠用常規的術語來理解它們，而且是為了改造它們令人厭惡的非人范圍。

We can heal the anthropogenic predicament by descaling its unnatural complexities back to graspable, proximate, organic norms. This approach is symmetrically opposite of what is to be done. The design platform that may provide some uncannily practical paths out of the Anthropocene is absolutely not one in which the vast impersonal temporal and spatial scales of global systems is brought to heel and drawn down to intuitive neurological and emotional comfort zones. To think and design in other ways and at other scales is not only theoretically more defensible, it's now, more importantly, a necessity. The weaving of long circuits should head in the opposite direction.

我們可以通過將其不自然的複雜性降級為可理解的、接近的、有機的規範來治愈人為的困境。這種方法與要做的事情對稱地相反。這個設計平台可能會提供一些走出人類世的不可思議的實用路徑，但絕對不是一個讓全球系統的巨大非個人時間和空間尺度屈服於直覺神經和情感舒適區的設計平台。以其他方式和其他尺度思考和設計不僅在理論上更站得住腳，更重要的是，現在這是一種必要。長電路的編織應朝相反的方向進行。

Design scaled to the scope of the real, not down-sampled to the digestible. But in this, what do we, in fact, mean by human? Not a clear term, as Mark and Beatrice's work makes so plain. Anthropogeny is the study of human origins, of how something that was not quite human becomes human. It considers what enables and curtails us today.

設計按比例縮放到真實範圍，而不是下採樣到可消化的範圍。但在這方面，我們實際上對人類意味著什麼？不是一個明確的術語，正如馬克和比阿特麗斯的作品所表明的那樣。人類學是對人類起源的研究，研究不完全是人類的事物如何成為人類。它考慮了今天是什麼使我們成為可能和限制我們。

Tool-making, prehensile grasp, the prefrontal cortex and abstraction, figuration, war, mastering fire and culinary chemistry, plastics, metals, the philosophical paths to agricultural urbanism, and so forth. But given that Darwinian biology and Huttonian geology are such new perspectives, we may say that scientific anthropogeny is really only very recently possible. Human emergence was and is still considered through the distorting lens of various folklores, creation myths, both sacred and secular, which have been placeholders for a real anthropogeny, but which still defend their turf. Think of it this way. When Hegel was binding the history of the world to the history of European national self-identity, it was assumed among his public that the age of the planet could be measured in a few millennia, 10 to the 3 or 10 to the 4th years, not eons, 10 to the 9th.

工具製作、抓握力、前額皮質和抽象、具象、戰爭、掌握火和烹飪化學、塑料、金屬、農業城市化的哲學路徑等等。但考慮到達爾文生物學和赫頓地質學都是如此新的觀點，我們可以說科學的人類學實際上只是最近才有可能。人類的出現過去是，現在仍然是通過各種民間傳說、創世神話的扭曲鏡頭來考慮的，無論是神聖的還是世俗的，它們一直是真正的人類起源的佔位符，但它們仍然捍衛著自己的地盤。這樣想。當黑格爾將世界歷史與歐洲民族認同史結合起來時，他的公眾認為地球的年齡可以用幾千年來衡量，10 至 3 年或 10 至 4 年，不是億萬年，從 10 到 9。

Now, at the same time, however, the anthropocenic puzzle is not unscrambled just by reason getting its way. The means by which we get outside our prejudicial intuitions about how the world works may also be the very means by which we undermine the ecological substrate upon which we depend. For example, as I and others have written about, the reason we know climate change is even happening at the nuanced degrees that we do is because of the measurement capacities of terrestrial, oceanic, atmospheric sensing meta-apparatuses that are at least representative of an industrial technical system whose appetite is significantly responsible for the changes being measured in the first place. We know it's happening because the machine that does it is telling us so. And indeed, this correspondence may be more the rule than the exception.

然而，與此同時，人類世的謎團並沒有因為理性得到解決而解開。我們擺脫對世界如何運作的偏見直覺的方式也可能是我們破壞我們賴以生存的生態基礎的方式。例如，正如我和其他人所寫的那樣，我們知道氣候變化甚至以我們所做的細微差別發生的原因是因為陸地、海洋、大氣傳感元設備的測量能力至少代表了一個工業技術系統，其胃口對首先測量的變化負有重大責任。我們知道它正在發生，因為執行它的機器告訴我們。事實上，這種對應可能更常見而不是例外。

But I think for our discussion, perhaps the more crucial example which I'll end on is that between oil and deep time. Finding oil was and is an impetus for the excavation of the earth, the ongoing project that turns up sedimentary layers of fossils and provides evidence of an old earth of deep time. If not for the comprehensive disgorging of fossil fuels since the late 19th century, we would not have this anthropocene. And if not for the economic incentive to look below and at rocks in this way, we may not have been confronted with the utter discontinuity between anthropometric time, social and historical time, and planetary time. Mining made geology possible, and geology made the unthinkable abyss of deep time a fundamental truth.

但我認為對於我們的討論，也許我要結束的更重要的例子是石油和深海之間的例子。發現石油過去是，現在仍然是地球挖掘的推動力，這個正在進行的項目會挖掘出化石的沉積層，並提供地球深處存在的證據。如果不是自 19 世紀末以來化石燃料的全面排放，我們就不會有這個人類世。如果不是出於以這種方式觀察下方和岩石的經濟動機，我們可能不會面臨人體測量時間、社會和歷史時間以及行星時間之間的完全不連續性。採礦使地質學成為可能，而地質學使深不可測的深淵成為基本真理。

So, even if deep time is one of the ways that we learn to de-link social, phenomenological time from planetary time, its discovery was made possible by an industry that operated upon nature cooperative with the local conceit that ecological time is subordinate to social time. But also now, by the accidental fulfillment, that the superstition by the actual anthropo— by the superstition by the actual anthropocentric binding of social and geologic time, or put differently, as put by Dipesh Chakrabarty and others, the anthropocene does in fact now make ecological time run on the clocks of social time and bind them. So, in other words, we dig for oil because we think the planet runs on our time, but because we did, we learn that this is not true. But by doing so, we made it true. By pursuing the illusion as if it were true, we discovered as a byproduct that it was false, but the byproduct of doing so is that we made it true.

因此，即使深度時間是我們學習將社會、現象學時間與行星時間脫鉤的方法之一，它的發現也是由一個以自然為基礎的行業與生態時間從屬於社會的當地自負合作的時間。但現在，由於偶然的實現，實際人類的迷信——通過社會和地質時間的實際人類中心主義結合的迷信，或者換句話說，正如 Dipesh Chakrabarty 和其他人所說的那樣，人類世現在確實使生態時間運行在社會時間的時鐘上並約束它們。所以，換句話說，我們開採石油是因為我們認為地球在我們這個時代運行，但因為我們這樣做了，我們才知道這不是真的。但通過這樣做，我們實現了它。通過把幻覺當作真的來追求，我們的副產品是發現它是假的，但這樣做的副產品是我們讓它變成了真的。

So, what else do we know? What else are we good for? If, as in Stanislaus Lem's Solaris, where the surface of the planet's ocean was sentient, planet Earth's strategy towards sentience includes layers, networks of neurons in the folded gray matter of animal brains, particularly but not exclusively the cerebral cortex of primates, namely humans. We are, as Nikolai Fedorov wrote a century ago, the medium through which the planet thinks. So, by having folded some of its matter into the shape of brains, and waiting a few million years for these blobs to sort it out, one of the things that the Earth very recently did, accomplished, was to learn its own age.

那麼，我們還知道什麼？我們還有什麼用？如果像斯坦尼斯勞斯·萊姆 (Stanislaus Lem) 的索拉里斯 (Solaris) 中那樣，行星海洋的表面是有知覺的，那麼地球的知覺策略包括動物大腦折疊灰質中的層、神經元網絡，特別是但不限於靈長類動物（即人類）的大腦皮層.正如尼古拉·費多羅夫 (Nikolai Fedorov) 一個世紀前所寫，我們是地球思考的媒介。所以，通過將它的一些物質折疊成大腦的形狀，並等待幾百萬年讓這些團塊把它整理出來，地球最近所做的事情之一，完成了，就是了解它自己的年齡。

Earth is roughly 4.6 billion years old. A confident figure for the age of the Earth came as late as 1953, the year that Beckett premiered Waiting for Godot. We, the Earth's digestive residue, were able to discover and know the planet's own duration. Quite impressive, as how for most of our existence, we thought that the planet ran on our time. So, lastly, was this project, in which the Earth formulated from itself a biochemical intensity, that is humans, that would prove capable of knowing how old it is, worth the cost?

地球大約有 46 億年的歷史。直到 1953 年，貝克特首映了《等待戈多》(Waiting for Godot)，這一年才出現了關於地球年齡的可靠數字。我們，地球的消化殘渣，能夠發現並知道地球自身的持續時間。令人印象深刻的是，在我們存在的大部分時間裡，我們認為這個星球在我們的時間裡運行。那麼，最後，這個項目，在這個項目中，地球從自身製定了一種生化強度，即人類，這將被證明能夠知道它的年齡，值得付出代價嗎？

Worth the cost? A Faustian bargain to top all. Was discovering this fundamental truth worth exhuming hundreds of millions of years of pre-Mesozoic biomatter for a two-century fuel supply and inauguration of mass extinction? I asked my students this, and they were split. Maybe the better question would have been, what would make it worth it?

值得嗎？最重要的是浮士德式的討價還價。為了兩個世紀的燃料供應和大規模滅絕的開始，發現這個基本真理是否值得挖掘數億年前的前中生代生物物質？我問過我的學生，他們分裂了。也許更好的問題是，什麼讓它值得？

Must the accomplishment of a Copernican epistemic disenchantment destroy or at least threaten that which it knows a necessary outcome? Or is it only provisional damage that will make for a more durable relationship between knower and known? The answer isn't given in advance. It must be designed, designated. Here and then, there and now.

哥白尼認識論的祛魅的實現是否必須摧毀或至少威脅到它知道必然結果的東西？還是只是暫時性的損害才能使知者與知者之間的關係更持久？答案沒有預先給出。它必須被設計、指定。此時此地，彼時彼地。

Thank you. APPLAUSE Thanks a lot, Ben. There is time for... I don't see anything. The light is really weird.

謝謝。掌聲 非常感謝，本。有時間……我什麼也沒看到。光線真的很奇怪。

There is time for some very few questions. Luckily, Ben was talking a bit longer than I thought. But we have time for a few questions. If you make yourself not visible, but make some noise... Wave your hand.

有時間回答一些非常少的問題。幸運的是，Ben 說的時間比我想像的要長一些。但我們有時間問幾個問題。如果你讓自己不被發現，但發出一些聲音……揮動你的手。

I'm here with a microphone. Please try to be concise and short in the questions so we can have at least two or three questions. I don't see anything. I want to take a second. What are you handing me?

我帶著話筒來了。請盡量在問題中簡明扼要，這樣我們至少可以提出兩三個問題。我什麼也沒看到。我想花點時間。你遞給我什麼？

I'll ask myself a question. No questions. I'm on video. Hi. Thanks for the talk. It was great.

我會問自己一個問題。沒有問題。我在看視頻你好。謝謝你的談話。太好了。

I'm just thinking about Chakrabarti's paper. Fourth thesis. Yeah, fourth thesis. The thing that strikes me about that paper is that he's a Marxist prior to writing this. He mentions it in the paper anyway.

我只是在想 Chakrabarti 的論文。第四篇論文。是的，第四篇論文。那篇論文讓我印象深刻的是，他在寫這篇文章之前是一個馬克思主義者。無論如何，他在報紙上提到了它。

But he... In the process of getting to geological time or how historical time forgets about that, he kind of... forgets about the subject somehow, which is maybe crucial for a Marxist. I just wonder, who's the designer? In relation to...

但他……在進入地質時間或歷史時間如何忘記這一點的過程中，他有點……以某種方式忘記了這個主題，這對馬克思主義者來說可能至關重要。我只是想知道，誰是設計師？和---關聯……

It's a question about designing. Who is... What does that look like? There isn't one answer to the question. It kind of depends on...

這是關於設計的問題。誰……那看起來像什麼？這個問題沒有唯一的答案。這有點取決於……

I would argue ultimately for a more expansive... an expansive concept of design and connotation of design, one that would include in many ways... evolutionary processes within complex system dynamics. And so we're talking about the way in which I chose to present QR codes, for example, as a kind of evolutionary adaptation on behalf of the environment... the urban environment develops in relation to the presence of this other kinds of species.

我最終會爭論一個更廣泛的……一個更廣泛的設計概念和設計的內涵，一個將在許多方麵包括……複雜系統動力學中的進化過程。因此，我們正在談論我選擇呈現二維碼的方式，例如，作為一種代表環境的進化適應……城市環境的發展與其他物種的存在有關.

I think one of the ways in which I think we need to... reform some of the connotations of design, in addition to one in which it refers more to designation rather than decoration, among other sort of things as well, is to think about, and I think Keller's talk deals with this, and she and I are, I think, quite in agreement on it, that really the... that in most cases, the design that we're most interested in, in fact, the design that we do in many ways, is setting the terms by which systems can unfold in particular directions, and that we seek in some ways to enforce certain outcomes within these as well. And so we're talking, which is the way sovereign systems and economic systems have worked, have worked in many sort of regards. The same way design is oftentimes kind of retroactive, where something will happen that there's a position of authority or a position of recognizable agency in relationship, there's something that's understood to be agent, and so it's presumed that the cause and effect relationship worked in this particular way.

我認為我認為我們需要……改革設計的一些內涵的方法之一，除了它更多地指代名稱而不是裝飾，以及其他一些事情之外，就是思考關於，我認為 Keller 的談話涉及到這一點，我認為她和我對此非常同意，真的……在大多數情況下，我們最感興趣的設計，事實上，我們在許多方面所做的設計，正在設定係統可以在特定方向展開的條款，並且我們也在某些方面尋求在這些方面強制執行某些結果。所以我們正在談論，這就是主權體系和經濟體系運作的方式，在許多方面都發揮了作用。同樣的方式，設計通常是一種追溯，其中會發生一些事情，在關係中有權威的位置或可識別的代理位置，有一些被理解為代理的東西，因此假定因果關係在此起作用具體做法。

I think the most important question, I think, to be thinking about this is also, and this had to do with some of the discussions around algorithmic governance, is the role of models. So it's less to do with, like, and we talked about this a bit in the workshop, that there's a ways, I think, part of the confusion is there's a presumption of overlap between agency and subjectivity that I think is actually quite problematic. Agency in many regards, I think models in many regards have a greater degree of agency than individual designers ever do, and have been as well. Now, design, of course, is we think of models at least in three different temporalities, going back to the issues of time. There's models that are descriptive, that their value has to do with their correspondence to the real, in one way or another, whether this is something we can directly experience or not.

我認為最重要的問題是模型的作用，我認為，這與圍繞算法治理的一些討論有關。所以這與我們在研討會上討論過這個問題關係不大，我認為有一種方法，部分混淆是我認為代理和主觀性之間存在重疊的假設實際上是有問題的。在許多方面，我認為模型在許多方面比個人設計師擁有更大程度的代理權，而且一直如此。現在，設計，當然，是我們至少在三個不同的時間性中考慮模型，回到時間問題。有些模型是描述性的，它們的價值與它們以某種方式與真實的對應有關，無論這是我們可以直接體驗的東西。

Heliocentrism is a better model than geocentrism because of its correspondence to the real. There's predictive models, which generally what Wall Street sort of evolves with, was trying to predict what's going to happen in the future based on variables. Predictive models don't have to be true. Like a tool, they just have to work, right? Screwdrivers aren't true, they just work in a certain way.

日心說是比地心說更好的模型，因為它對應於真實世界。有預測模型，通常是華爾街的演變，試圖根據變量預測未來會發生什麼。預測模型不一定是真實的。就像一個工具，他們只需要工作，對吧？螺絲刀不是真的，它們只是以某種方式工作。

Predictive models have this kind of structure. Design's real facility, though, has traditionally been in projective models, not models of what is or what's going to be, but in fact what should be. The normative claims of the models, normative models that then have some capacity to realize themselves and enforce the normative claims as one brick gets put on top of another in particular ways. Now, part of the interesting thing, of course, is the ways in which these models get mixed up in different ways. And certain ways in which the value of them, as we talked about in the session, the ways in which the value of the model may be when it doesn't come true.

預測模型具有這種結構。然而，設計的真正工具傳統上是在投影模型中，不是關於現在或將要成為什麼的模型，而是實際上應該是什麼的模型。模型的規範性主張，規範性模型具有一定的能力來實現自身並在以特定方式將一塊磚放在另一塊磚頭上時強制執行規範性主張。現在，部分有趣的事情當然是這些模型以不同方式混合在一起的方式。正如我們在會議中談到的那樣，它們的價值的某些方式，當它沒有實現時模型的價值可能存在的方式。

So if you have a model of what of the bad things that are going to happen if CO2 continues to go into the atmosphere, we realize the implication of this model, pull CO2 out of the atmosphere, decarbonize infrastructures. The prediction becomes not true anymore. You want models and in fact invalidate that the implication is their own invalidation to a certain degree. And so there's a longer discussion around the agency of models, the role of which models from other kinds of contexts, economic models, financial models, archaeological models, can work in this particular way as well. But I think one of the things that I've been working on quite recently is particularly this agency of models, which is quite differently, as I would say, from the sort of autobiographical subjectivity of individual designers.

因此，如果你有一個模型來說明如果二氧化碳繼續進入大氣層會發生什麼壞事，我們就會意識到這個模型的含義，將二氧化碳從大氣中抽出，使基礎設施脫碳。預言不再正確。您想要模型並且實際上使模型無效，這意味著在某種程度上是它們自己的無效。因此，圍繞模型的代理進行了更長時間的討論，來自其他類型背景的模型的作用，經濟模型，金融模型，考古模型，也可以以這種特定方式發揮作用。但我認為我最近一直在做的一件事尤其是這種模特代理，正如我所說，這與個人設計師的自傳體主觀性完全不同。

There's one more question because we're really running out of time. Yeah, thanks so much. I also had a question about subjects and particular users. And the basic form is as a user of subject, and to continue that, is usership a universal? Is there an outside of the stack?

還有一個問題，因為我們真的沒時間了。是的，非常感謝。我還有一個關於主題和特定用戶的問題。基本形式是作為 subject 的 user，繼續說，usership 是普遍的嗎？棧外有嗎？

Yes. Well, to the first one, easy. Yeah. This is better? Okay.

是的。好吧，對於第一個，簡單。是的。這個更好？好的。

But look, user is a... Like a subject, user is a position. It's not an identity, right? Any one of us enters into or out of multiple user positions many, many times per day, right? Any sort of times in which we engage with various interfacial elements that cause cascades up and down the stack, we are being constructed within a slightly, you know, user way as well.

但是你看，用戶是一個……就像一個主題，用戶是一個位置。這不是身份，對吧？我們中的任何一個人每天都會多次進入或退出多個用戶位置，對嗎？在任何時候，當我們與各種界面元素互動時，這些界面元素會在堆棧中上下級聯，我們也在以一種輕微的、你知道的、用戶的方式構建。

It's not isomorphic with your self-identity. It's also not isomorphic with the sort of longer-term pattern construction of a particular user profile, right? It is in fact a position and one that is, strangely enough, as far as stack systems are concerned, available to animal, vegetable, mineral, individuals, pluralities, one way or another, which is all the more strange that we insist on mobilizing and designing this user position according to the single subject with the names, rank, and serial number attached to this as well. And so, again, this disindividuation and pluralization of subject positions within these systems, I think, is one of the key design challenges and ethics we need to sort of develop going forward. But yes, there's always outside of the...

它與你的自我認同不同構。它也不與特定用戶配置文件的那種長期模式構造同構，對嗎？事實上，就堆棧系統而言，它實際上是一個位置和一個位置，非常奇怪，動物、植物、礦物、個體、複數以某種方式可用，這更奇怪的是我們堅持動員並根據單個主題設計這個用戶位置，並附上名稱、級別和序號。因此，我認為，這些系統中主體位置的去個性化和多元化是我們未來需要發展的關鍵設計挑戰和倫理之一。但是，是的，外面總是有……

We're talking, you know, it's an apparatus that is discontinuous, it understands that it's planetary in scope, but like any other kind of system is defined by its own shifting interiorities and exteriorities at any different point in time. It's a theory of totality, but it's not meant to be an absolute, you know, enclosure in any sort of regard. Okay, so...

我們說的是，你知道，它是一個不連續的裝置，它知道它在行星範圍內，但就像任何其他類型的系統一樣，它在任何不同的時間點都由其自身不斷變化的內部性和外部性來定義。這是一個整體理論，但它並不意味著在任何方面都是絕對的，你知道的，圈地。可以，然後呢……