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tags: 採訪共筆, COVID-19, 武漢肺炎
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# Interview request (done) - French media Usbek & Rica
(CC BY 4.0 by Pablo Maillé & g0v contributors)
[Answers taken on April 3rd - article published here: https://usbeketrica.com/article/a-taiwan-la-civic-tech-en-premiere-ligne-face-a-l-epidemie]
### 協作者簽名
協作者 contributors:
kiang
Jetter
stimim
chihao
協作翻譯 translators：
Li-Hsuan Lung
**回覆請留下你的 ID 以及希望被引用時使用的英文名字。歡迎用華語回覆！也歡迎社群朋友協作翻譯！**
**Please leave your ID and the name you want to use when being quoted.**
---
Dear g0v members,
> 親愛的g0v成員，
> Hi Pablo, we g0vers call ourselves “contributors” or “participants” but not “members” since the community does not have a clear sense of membership. Regarding use of word in French, some discussions were had and documented [here](https://g0v.hackmd.io/RcvVnWJ6Tr-SsUIXcEoOaA). Hope that’s helpful. [name=chihao]
I am Pablo Maillé and I’m a French journalist for the magazine Usbek & Rica (https://usbeketrica.com/). First of all, I sincerely hope you are doing well.
> 我是法國雜誌[Usbek & Rica](https://usbeketrica.com/)的記者Pablo Maillé。首先，我誠心希望您們平安無事。
I’m reaching out to you today because I'd like to write an article about the ways in which civic hacking and civic tech communities in Taiwan participated in the country's successful fight against the coronavirus spread. Here are the main questions I had in mind (hope I'm doing this in the right way!):
> 我今日聯絡你們是因為我想寫一篇文章報導台灣的公民黑客和公民科技社群如何參與國家成功抵制冠狀病毒的傳播的各種活動。以下是我想出來的主要問題（希望我做得沒錯！）：
* How did g0v members participate in civic tech projects helping to fight the spread of coronavirus in Taiwan? Can you describe your personal experience(s) and concrete projects over those past few weeks?
> g0v成員是如何參與公民科技專案來幫助台灣抵制冠狀病毒的傳播？可否請您敘述您過去數個禮拜的個人經歷和實際專案？
> * [武漢肺炎地圖](https://kiang.github.io/2019-nCoV/)
> 在地圖上顯示確診病例的統計數字，包含台灣、中國的區域性資料以及來自 JHU 的全球資料
> 2020/01/21 在台灣出現首例確診後就開始關注疫情發展，當時大部份的病例都出現在中國，在 [JHU CSSE](https://systems.jhu.edu/research/public-health/ncov/)的網頁看到來自[中國丁香園的資料](https://ncov.dxy.cn/ncovh5/view/pneumonia)後就嘗試運用資料製作地圖，同時透過程式記錄與追蹤確診案例的變化情況，後來再加入 JHU 以及台灣疾管署的資料
> [name=kiang]
> * [藥局口罩採購地圖](https://kiang.github.io/pharmacies/)
> 在地圖上顯示可以採購藥局的位置，以及口罩的即時庫存與基本資訊
> 2020/02/04 唐鳳政委在 g0v slack 提到口罩分配政策即將調整後，因為提供的資料完整所以就會想要做些嘗試，主要的程式在 2020/02/05 台南小松活動就已經完成， 2020/02/06 跟著政府釋出資料後正式上線服務至今
> [name=kiang]
> * [口罩供需即時資訊查詢](https://yasco.com.tw/tw/mask.asp)
> 個人服務的公司也是這次口罩國家隊的口罩生產工廠, 在g0v得知口罩實名制即將上路於政府2/5政府將釋出的資料後完成網頁編寫, 主要以文字模式並輔以手機定位, 讓頻寬低的使用者可以很快取得資訊, 2020/02/06正式上線服務至今, 累積至今網頁瀏覽量大約為1千七百萬
> [name=Jetter]
* Is it the first time that you see a government and civic hackers communities collaborating to this scale? Or do you have previous examples in mind (in Taiwan)?
> 這是否是您第一次見到政府和公民黑客社群如此大規模的合作？或者您有其他前例（在台灣）？
> 這的確是第一次看到這麼多公民黑客社群開發者針對單一議題開發出上百個應用，過去 g0v 的專案參與都是很分散的，每個專案大多都是個位數的開發者參與，少部份專案因為設計了群眾外包的模式而會吸引大量民眾參與資料編輯工作，但沒有過上百個開發者同時投入單一議題的記錄[name=kiang]
> 這是我第一次參與這麼開發者共同投入單一公眾議題的項目, 也是首次加入g0v的專案.[name=Jetter]
> In the past during public crisis such as earthquakes, explosions, floods, or social movements, g0v contributors, platforms, and tools have been useful to gather information for those in need while government responses might have been slower or less adequate. [name=chihao]
* During the Civic Hacking For Public Health/FtO event last week, some summarized the point of those initiatives as: “The government is better at providing good data, and the hackers are better at building tools.” Do you agree with this?
> 上禮拜舉辦公民黑客防疫協作陣線的時候，有人提出這些專案的共通點：「政府善於開放資料，黑客善於開發工具。」您同意這個論點嗎？
> 應該說只有政府會基於服務公眾大規模的蒐集資料，對於一般個人或中小型企業，要想累積同樣規模的資料會有很大的門檻，因此大多會期待政府端開放資料，讓民間可以運用這些資料延伸各種應用
> 政府不擅長開發工具是因為一般公務人員並非工具的主要使用者，除了很難體會使用者需求，內部決策流程冗長與充滿變數也讓發展出來的工具不容易貼近使用者的期待[name=kiang]
* How does the Taiwanese government provide the data to the hackers and the public? Would you say it’s transparent and trustworthy, or do you need to do some fact-checking?
> 台灣政府如何提供資料給黑客和一般民眾？您認為這些資料足以信任和透明嗎？或者您需要先查核事實？
> 如果政府端願意主動提供的資料，一般都可以在[政府資料開放平台](https://data.gov.tw/)找到，因為長期以來公務人員遵守法規的文化讓這些資料大多值得信任；不過遇到有爭議的資料就不一樣了，像是企業違規記錄或是被污染的土地資料等等，政府端經常因為利害關係人的抗議而讓資料失真或釋出不易使用的格式，這時候就得花許多時間進行資料的清理或持續提出資料索取要求，但基本上很少遇到有資料造假的情況[name=kiang]
> I think public trust over government data is sufficient overall. I also think we might be lacking auditing processes for government data. [name=chihao]
* What kind of counterpowers (laws, judicial courts, NGOs, organizations, committees, etc.) do exist in Taiwan for making sure that those data are protected and respectful of human rights?
> 在台灣有哪些反抗權力（法律、司法機關、NGO、組織、委員會等）可以確保這些資料受到保護和尊重人權？
> 台灣有許多先進的法規，但是卻沒有嚴謹遵循法規的習慣，像是道路交通違規與違建、污染等等，造成政府端存在很多處理例外的作法或是讓違規的罰款低到讓違法的人不覺得痛，在這樣的文化下許多時候政府與企業都是採取投機的心態，在模糊的地方先行動，等到爭議發生才開始試圖修補錯誤
> 關注這類議題的就像是[臺權會](https://www.tahr.org.tw/)，但很多時候他們提出的警告不容易產生迴響，因為台灣從專制政權走向民主也不過幾十年的時間，大部分人習慣被動接受政府的安排，儘管從歐美的慣例看來已經侵犯了人權[name=kiang]
* What do you think has enabled this creative collaboration in the case of Taiwan? What kind of factors? For instance, having such a civic tech/ethical hacking-acquainted Digital Minister as Audrey Tang - does it help in any way?
> 您認為是什麼促成了這些在台灣的創意合作？有哪一些因素？舉例來說，有一位對公民科技和道德黑客熟稔的數位政委唐鳳——是否有所幫助？
> 台灣重視集體意志與精英領導的文化是主要的基礎，唐鳳的存在符合了這兩個基本要素，因此產生前所未有的影響力，促成這次集體創作成果
> 唐鳳熟悉技術與黑客文化，能夠在最高決策會議中直接給予具體建議，這些建議在政府單位會被視為指令有效落實；對比一般公民黑客由下而上提出建議的過程，經常在層層討論中就被拒絕與無視，這是很明顯的落差
> 唐鳳扮演數位政委的角色一定有幫助，但我擔心的是如果換了一個人，這些已經存在的架構都可能會消失[name=kiang]
* Taiwan also uses digital contact tracing and location data. For instance, when coronavirus cases were discovered on the Diamond Princess ship after a stop in Taiwan, text messages were sent to every mobile phone, listing the restaurants, tourist sites and destinations that the ship’s passengers had visited during their shore leave. Do you have any privacy concern about this method?
> 台灣也運用了電子接觸者追蹤資料。舉例來說，當政府發現停靠過台灣的鑽石公主號上有冠狀病毒確診之後，將該船乘客所到過的所有餐廳和旅遊景點的資料傳給每一台手機。您對這種做法是否有侵犯隱私權的疑慮？
> 這很直覺就是侵犯了隱私，而政府在執行這個政策時不需要經過公開的討論以及國會具體授權，只靠模糊的文字就讓政府能夠無限上綱的使用隱私資料，由少數或甚至是個人就可以決定資料的公開與否，沒有明確的原則與範圍讓人擔心這樣侵犯個人隱私資料的程度會隨著疫情時間拉長日益加深[name=kiang]
> Regarding privacy concern, I think there are three different aspects to discuss, 'How to collect' and 'What is collected', and 'How data will be used'. I don't know if the government received consent from the tourists on Diamond Princess before tracking their location data. Similarly, I have no idea what data government got from mobile network operators. Therefore, I do have concern on these two things.
> On the other hand, when the government released the location history of the tourists, (from my point of view) the data itself doesn't reveal any personal identifying information (PII). Visited points are merged into a single file, and all points are marked with a wide range of time (08:00~17:00, IIRC). It is hard to learn more about the tourists based on this information. From my point of view, this way of using collected data should be acceptable (i.e. no privacy concern).
> [name=stimim]
* More generally speaking, what is your view of the ongoing debate about the right balance to be found between privacy protection and the use of big data? Here in France, political leaders and activists seem to be reluctant about using big data, but do you think the use of tech tools - including ones that collect your location and personal data - are inevitable for fighting such an epidemic?
> 更廣泛地說，您對現下在保護隱私和運用大數據之間尋找平衡點的辯論中有何看法？在我們法國，政府領導者和社會運動者似乎不太情願使用大數據，但您認為使用這些科技——包括採集你的位置和個人資料——來打擊大規模傳染病，是否為必須的？
> 我覺得現在疫情大規模傳播的情況的確應該有些非常作法，只要這個作法能夠公開經過公眾與國會的檢驗後授權政府執行，政府也在有限的期間與範圍內運用這些資料達到疫情控制目的，這是可以被接受的
> 現況幾乎找不到比運用手機訊號追蹤使用者更好的作法，其他替代方式都會需要使用者進行繁複的操作，同時使用者不願意揭露真實行蹤的情況非常普遍，每一次的欺騙都會造成疫病防治的極大風險，武漢肺炎所帶來的影響已經是戰爭等級，我覺得在面臨人類存亡關鍵時需要跨過一些過去所熟悉的界線，在戰爭結束後再試著做更多的封印，畢竟活下去才有機會討論更多細節[name=kiang]
> As I said in the previous answer, the government should clearly specify 'How data is collected', 'What data is collected', 'How data will be used'. They can start with announcing emergencies acts first. And they should also provide a way for civilians to audit (e.g. open source, open API are good starts).
> Communication and transparency is important during this period. Both government and society need (good) data to fight the virus. If civilians are suspicious, and are concerned about their privacy, this would hurt the quality of data too. For example, what if people start to turn off their phone, and only turn it on when they really need to make a phone call, just because they suspect the government is tracking them via their phone?
> In most of time, "big data" doesn't need to include PII. E.g. if the government wants to know how many people were at a train station at a specific time, they *can* count number of cellular signals, but they shouldn't need to know the identity of the owners of phones.
> On the other hand, when the government needs to track a confirmed case, then the government has to know / already knows the identity of the confirmed case. This is not "big data", this is a different case of 'How data will be used'. Therefore the constraint / requirements should be defined differently.
> [name=stimim]
* If so, how can we make sure that the same tools are not used anymore by governments once the epidemic is over?
> 如果是必須的，那我們又如何確保傳染病結束後政府不會繼續使用這些工具？
> 制定嚴重的懲罰方式以及附帶完整的吹哨者條款，適時引入第三方公正單位的稽核，任何在政府單位濫用這些工具的人應該要遭受嚴厲的懲罰[name=kiang]
> We need more people caring about politics and government. If civilians don't care about their own privacy, nothing can stop the government.
> "Not used anymore" is a strong word, if there are good reasons to keep using some of the tools / mechanisms developed during the epidemic, we should pass a law and formally grant permissions to the government (with clear limitations).
> [name=stimim]
Thank you very much in advance for your time.
> 謝謝您寶貴的時間。
Best,
Pablo Maillé
Journalist - usbeketrica.com
pablo.maille [at] usbeketrica.com
